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Summary
Many organizations seek to employ Big Data (BD) to improve their decision-making and
business sustainability. Cloud computing becomes the preferable deployment model for many
industries and academia alike. The cloud paradigm is enabling them to take advantage of the
provided efficiency, scalability, cost savings, and flexibility for large-scale data processing,
management, and storage. The success of the cloud for BD is no longer dominated only by
performance and cost. Rather, there are several other elements, areas, and criteria related to
trust that need to be taken into consideration. These considerations are mainly due to the fact
that data is no longer physically maintained under the organization’s direct control, which
raises new security concerns. Lay the groundwork for designing, improving, and implement-
ing strategies to ensure a realistic BD over Cloud (BigCloud) model security is now critical
more than ever. However, addressing BigCloud vulnerabilities and the research in this criti-
cal domain was limited and considered a cloud computing security issue without remedying
BD specifications.The need for an in-depth investigation to develop a technology-independent
reference architecture and evaluation of trust for BigCloud systems is very limited. Such a
study can be focused on addressing the security concerns of the BigCloud and associated BD
technologies, as for IoT-to-the cloud paradigm.
This thesis establishes a framework relying on the security of the BigCloud architecture
to improve security issues. Specifically, this thesis research aims to examine the common
features and the security challenges of this integration to provide an architecture relying on
the security analysis, evaluation theory, and security by design of the cloud deployment archi-
tecture to improve the large-scale data processing security issues. Also, it aims at enhancing
the cloud-based BD frameworks security in storage, motion, and process. Implementing best
guidelines and practices for managing security related to BD operations over cloud computing
technology and updating industry security guidelines, frameworks, and standards are of this
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thesis concerns. Moreover, this thesis introduces an analytical model for data-intensive use
case (i.e., Iot-to-cloud data streaming) security measurements, within any cloud-based frame-
work. The thesis aims to fill the existing gap between the statistical representation of quality
approaches of software engineering and the analysis of securing BD applications. Also, rec-
ommend best practices and measurements when constructing BD systems in both centralized
and decentralized clouds. The proposed reference model and framework provides a compre-
hensive and fundamental basis to optimize the design of BigClouda frameworks regarding
security ultimately.
Key Words Cloud Computing, Vehicular Cloud, IoT, Privacy, Evaluation Framework,
Security by Design.
Background
This thesis’s focus is to enhance the security modeling, implementation, and testing of cloud
computing to cope with the BD environment without redesigning or modifying its structures.
Also, toward improving BigCloud frameworks security in storage, motion, and processing.
Our investigation of BigCloud security challenges has identified a research gap in the area
of security by design of BD systems and how to evaluate the system security components.
Figure 1.1 shows a diagram that illustrates our vision for the BigCloud software platform as
a “Big Data as a Service” for BD frameworks deployments, whether centralized or decentral-
ized architectures, in the public cloud.
This thesis researches two main problems related to modern cloud security: BD opera-
tional management in centralized and decentralized clouds. The thesis combines these do-
mains as well as the associated requirements and features.
The first problem is related to meeting centralized cloud security at the design level. Secu-
rity by design is increasingly becoming the mainstream development approach to ensure the
security and privacy of different deployment systems. It indicates that the system has been
designed from the foundation to be secure. In such an approach, the alternate security tac-
tics and patterns are first thought, and, among them, the best is selected and enforced by the
architecture design. It is then used as guiding principles for developers.
The second domain discussed in this thesis is related to developing a security evaluation
framework for one of the most trending challenges in the modern decentralized cloud de-
ployments architectures, in particular, the vehicular clouds that represent a special case of the
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). This use-case represents a data streaming approach
xiv
towards the cloud. We also discuss the critical realization of security by design, security
control elements, and an evaluation approach in modern computer science.
Cloud computing
Cloud computing is changing the way IT industry is delivered in enterprises around the
world. Its features include improving cost efficiencies, availability, accelerated innovation,
faster time-to-market, ability to scale applications on-demand, and better resources customized
for on-demand use-cases. Cloud computing is very well known as a critical IT resource for
organizations that seek to harness the power of big data analysts (BDA) to improve their
decision-making and business sustainability. Its importance lies in allowing organizations
to scale up or scale down IT infrastructure properties (such as memory storage, CPU) ac-
cording to their demands. Additionally, the cloud’s adoption could help organizations save
unnecessary expenditure on buying, managing, and upgrading IT resources for BD and BDA
processing and handling. The use of cloud computing plays a vital role in shifting the re-
sponsibilities of buying, controlling, and maintaining the infrastructure and software, which
are shifted from organizations to cloud providers. This shift will help organizations to fo-
cus more on their core business and leave many IT-related activities to be handled by cloud
providers. In the cloud computing context, privacy is a crucial dimension of trust and many
service providers have stressed it.
Vehicular Cloud
This thesis sheds light on the Vehicular Cloud (VC) security as a case of study for BD
streaming to the cloud. VC is a group of broadly autonomous vehicles whose corporate
computing, sensing, communication, and physical resources can be coordinated and dynam-
ically allocated to share Internet access and therefore, exchanging data and information with
other devices both inside and outside the vehicle. The VC can be formed by autonomous
vehicles and provides a vast number of applications and services that can benefit the entire
transportation system and drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. The intent to utilize the exces-
sive onboard resources in the transportation system, along with the latest computing resource
management technology in conventional clouds, has cultivated VC’s concept. In general, it is
composed of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET), which is a wireless ad hoc network of
mobile vehicles. Also, the communication between the vehicles and other objects (vehicle-
to-everything, V2X) as for infrastructure and other vehicles.
Big Data and Hadoop
Data can be structured (e.g., financial, electronic medical records, government statistics),
xv
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semi-structured (e.g., text, tweets, emails), unstructured (e.g., audio and video), and real-time
(e.g., network traces, generic monitoring logs). All of these applications share the potential
for providing invaluable insights if organized and analyzed appropriately. Big Data Analyt-
ics allows getting enormous benefits by dealing with any massive volume of unstructured,
structured, and semi-structured content. However, Big Data processing represents a magnif-
icent risk for many users due to the various data gathered from all available sources. On
the other hand, Hadoop and its associated technologies, i.e., YARN for resource manage-
ment and HDFS for distributed storage, had been widely used in the last years as a defacto
platform for all BD workloads. These workloads are spanning from batch-processing, e.g.,
MapReduce, and micro-batch processing (Apache Spark) to real-time processing frameworks
(Apache Flink or Apache Storm). As a large-scale system, Hadoop reliability and availability
are significant issues not solved in the standard implementation.
Hadoop abstracts computing resource management, task scheduling, and data manage-
ment while maintaining a satisfactory security and isolation level. The Hadoop stack is typ-
ically deployed as part of a large-scale BD platform to support commodity hardware and
accommodate different processing frameworks. It is utilized to handle data management and
access to the Hadoop ecosystem using a master/slave architecture. The large community be-
hind Hadoop has been working to improve its stack to meet BD’s increasing demands and
requirements. The new features shift proves the maturity and applicability of Hadoop 3.x
to serve different markets, thus, making it a prominent paradigm that combines large-scale
computing nodes to build an analytical environment, e.g., BD processing and storage.
Research Objectives
There is a critical need to systematically and comprehensively evaluate the security mech-
anisms implemented to meet the security requirements of BD applications and ensure that
computer security is fail-safe and provided on IaaS/PaaS cloud environments. The devel-
oped model when deployed assesses the compliance, capabilities, and limitations of the se-
curity mechanism implemented on the cloud environment. Also, this model attempts to test
the effectiveness of the BD frameworks in capturing customer security requirements in the
evaluation and assessment process. In this thesis, we evaluate the compliance, abilities, and
restrictions of the security mechanism when a cloud-based BD solution is deployed. Also, we
attempt to test the effectiveness of the framework in capturing customer security requirements
in the evaluation and assessment process.
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BigCloud presents a complex architecture that needs to be broken down and understood to
evaluate security requirements that are expected to be met by security methods and controls.
Mainly, this objective aims to evaluate cloud architecture’s ability to deliver a system that
fulfills the users’ security requirements and to identify potential risks on each component of
the BD frameworks. Also, it is required a developed reference model that can be adapted to
segregate IaaS/PaaS cloud architectures into layers in an attempt to identify its components,
and how these components integrate to provide cloud services and security mechanisms im-
plemented in the cloud.
The primary goals of this thesis are:
• Objective 1: A critical evaluation of BD platforms over cloud architectures.
• Objective 2: A thorough review of current security and privacy issues in cloud-based
Big Data applications/frameworks and their security requirements mapping and classi-
fication.
• Objective 3 A comprehensive evaluation of different techniques regarding BD service
security, concerning infrastructure, data, and applications.
• Objective 4 To establish an architecture relying on the security of the network and
identify the framework components.
• Objective 5 To propose a security analysis model for Big Data platforms, which inte-
grates software quality concepts and best practises.
• Objective 5: To formalize security abstractions, besides reliability and trust measure-
ments of cloud-based Big Data solutions.
• Objective 6 To propose and intensively evaluate a security evaluation framework for
vehicular cloud applications.
Research Questions
The critical questions that this thesis discusses on BigCloud security are:




ii. How to analyze and evaluate the security level of a cloud-based BD solution.
iii. What are the common security criteria of all BigCloud models, and how can we opti-
mize them toward large-scale data streaming models.
Thesis Methodology
The primary objective of our research plan is to focus on the integration of both BD processing
frameworks (e.g., Hadoop) and BD streaming (e.g., IoT-based applications) to the cloud de-
ployment model, analyzing the characteristic features, security gaps, and providing a security
model to improve the large-scale data processing over the cloud.
This thesis achieved its goals by survey all the current security and privacy challenges
imposed by processing BD workloads in the cloud. We start assessing all require tools, appli-
cations, and data dependencies in deploying the proposed solutions. Next, we define common
criteria that unified the security evaluation of different BD implementations and use cases.
Afterward, we enrolled in studying the security in design impact on the overall BD security.
Finally, we draft our novel evaluation framework.
For formalizing the thesis background, we start with survey the security challenges of the
integration of BD deployments and Cloud Computing. Our objective is to provide an archi-
tecture relying on the security of the network in order to improve the security issues. Next, we
search to define and examine the needed software tools for integrating the model-driven engi-
neering concepts in the form of a meta-model, which a cloud-based big data application can
exploit to become security-aware. With this approach, we seek to capture security require-
ments and capabilities to drive application deployment as well as security-oriented scalability
rules to guide application re-configuration.
In a third phase, we study the underlying cloud-based system vulnerabilities aiming to
addresses its challenges. Specifically, we focus on improving the large-scale data process-
ing security issues in both centralized and decentralized clouds, and the Cloud-based BD
frameworks security in storage, motion, and processing. We achieve these goals by imple-
menting the best guidelines and practices for managing security related to BD operations over
cloud computing technologies and updating industry security guidelines, frameworks, and
standards. However, to establish an evaluation framework, we relied on defining standard se-
curity criteria within any data stream solution to the cloud. These criteria can be shared within
any BD platforms over the cloud deployment architectures.
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A fourth phase includes designing and implementing the proposed model architecture
to improve the security issues based on the security of the BD platform/user. Besides, a
method for creating re-usable security elements facilitating rapid security model specification
conforming to the meta-model is also suggested, to reduce the designer’s modeling effort and
automate the cloud-based Big Data applications security management. While at the fourth
phase, the evaluating experiments start, to conceptually evaluate the model performance, the
results checking will take place during the fifth phase, to modify the selected modes and edit
the architecture design. During the sixth phase, we will conduct an extensive evaluation of
the proposed model, and, finally, in the last phase, we submit the final architecture design and
we write up the thesis.
Results and Publications
This thesis aims to explore the BigCloud security criteria that can influence the overall security
degree for BD processing over the cloud environment. Converging cloud-security concerns
to the software engineering technical expertise can sustain this tendency, by drafting security
models that address these concerns.
This research contributes to the deployment of the VC security body of knowledge by first
examining in detail the building blocks of the vehicular cloud security stack architecture. Sec-
ond, it analyses and classifies state-of-the-art security frameworks, which are mainly available
today as open-source platforms for sophisticated criteria selection. Third, a rigorous and ro-
bust evaluation framework based on evaluation theory, which guides VC service providers to
identify security gaps, is proposed. Finally, we highlight some open challenges and recom-
mendations for both service providers and customers for a comprehensive discussion toward
achieving the vision of providing IoV-cloud secure services.
Our thesis led to the exploration, identification, and understanding of six common security
criteria (CSC’s) that generally influence BigCloud security, namely:
• Physical and Environmental Protection





• Data and Service Availability
• Data Privacy and Governance
The findings of these CSCs are presented according to the directed content analysis ap-
proach of the BigCloud environment. These CSCs focuses on identifying and extracting the
security criteria that affect the deployment of BD applications in the cloud, including IoT-to-
cloud applications. After comparing the similarity and differences of those criteria, they were
grouped and labeled into sub-categories according to their relationships. All categories were
combined with the exact main category.
However, evaluating the trustworthiness of the security design and implementation is vital
for the sustainable integration of such a paradigm. This can be achieved by regularly checking
the security components of the VC to devise an adequate plan for improvement. In this regard,
we present a rigorous and robust evaluation model called trustworthiness evaluation of vehic-
ular cloud (TrustE-VC) [10]. The proposed framework formalizes the main ideas discussed in
the literature for security criteria evaluation and selection. Diagrammatic security levels, mul-
ticriteria decision making, and additive weight fuzzy ranking are the framework components.
TrustE-VC identifies the standard security criteria, providing security gap analysis according
to a multicriteria decision-making algorithm for supporting VC applications as a commodity
service in the cloud. The results show that the average performance rate of TrustE-VC and
the ideal point that describes the security criteria associated with each VC component need
urgent improvement in several domains. Moreover, based on the framework results, several
recommendations have been made to fill these gaps.
On the other hand, this thesis introduces an analytical model for BD security measure-
ments within any cloud-based framework in the design phase. It is aiming to fill the existing
gap between the statistical representation of quality approaches of software engineering and
the analysis of securing BD applications. Our thesis recommends best practices and mea-
surements when constructing BD systems in both centralized and decentralized clouds. The
proposed model, thus, provides a comprehensive and fundamental basis to optimize the design
of BD frameworks regarding security ultimately.
This thesis also summarizes the relationship between the security service and other cloud
services as well as their functions. We offer a solution to the main research question, which
deals with the security elements associated with BD deployment over the cloud. Our solution
consists of main actors that emphasize the separation of concerns regarding the service func-
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tionality (data service security, IaaS security, etc.) and non-functional security requirements
at the beginning of the design, through a reuse-based approach and specifications. Moreover,
we propose a security analysis pattern that refines the cloud context-pattern in synergy to an
extended CIA triad (CIA refers to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data), providing
a set of guidelines for the structuring of BD specifications, which relates a cloud design to its
security environment. Finally, we suggest a structured election method for BigCloud-specific
security selection that delivers many insights regarding the latest ongoing developments and
cutting-edge frameworks by mapping each security domain to its solution knowledge.
Publications
Next, we present a list of publications derived from the work developed in this thesis in peer
reviewed journals and high-impact conferences.
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• Mohammad N. Aladwan, Feras M. Awaysheh, Mamoun Alazab, J. C. Cabaleiro, T.
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net of vehicles evaluation and selection,” in 2019 18th IEEE International Conference
On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications/13th IEEE Inter-
national Conference On Big Data Science And Engineering (TrustCom/BigDataSE).
IEEE, 2019, pp. 807–813 GGS Rating: B-
Published Journal articles:
• Mohammad N. Aladwan, Feras M. Awaysheh, Sadi Alawadi, Mamoun Alazab, Tomás
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trial Connected Vehicles in the Cloud” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,
16(9):6203-6213, 2020. Both first authors contributed equally to this publication. Im-
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Under Review Journal articles:
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Moitas organizacións buscan empregar o Big Data (BD) para mellorar a toma de decisións
e a sustentabilidade empresarial. A computación na nube vense convertendo, deste xeito, no
modelo de despregamento preferible non so para a industria senón tamén para a comunida-
de investigadora. O paradigma na nube permı́telles aproveitar a eficiencia, a escalabilidade,
o aforro de custos e a flexibilidade proporcionados para o procesamento, xestión e almace-
namento de datos a grande escala. O éxito da nube para BD xa non está dominado só polo
rendemento e o custo, senón que hai que considerar tamén outros elementos, áreas e criterios
relacionados coa confianza. Estas consideracións débense principalmente a que os datos xa
non se manteñen fisicamente baixo o control directo da organización, o que suscita novos
problemas de seguridade. Debido a isto, sentar as bases para deseñar, mellorar e implementar
estratexias para garantir a seguridade dun modelo BD sobre Cloud (BigCloud) é agora máis
importante que nunca. Os aspectos de seguridade no dominio BigCloud céntrase na actualida-
de na seguridade xeral da nube, sen ter en consideración as especificidades da natureza BD. A
necesidade dunha investigación en profundidade para desenvolver unha arquitectura de refe-
rencia independente da tecnoloxı́a e a avaliación da confianza dos sistemas BigCloud é clara.
Un estudo como este pode centrarse en atender as cuestións de seguridade do BigCloud e as
tecnoloxı́as BD asociadas, como por exemplo no paradigma IoT-cloud.
Esta tese establece un marco baseado na seguridade da arquitectura BigCloud para me-
llorar os problemas de seguridade. En concreto, esta investigación busca examinar as carac-
terı́sticas comúns e os retos de seguridade desta integración para proporcionar unha arqui-
tectura baseada na análise de seguridade, a teorı́a de avaliación e a seguridade mediante o
deseño da arquitectura de despregamento na nube co obxectivo de mellorar os problemas de
seguridade no procesamento de datos a gran escala. Ademais, búscase mellorar a segurida-
de nas contornas Big Data baseados na nube tanto para o almacenamento, o movemento e o
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procesamento da información. Outro interese da tese é a aplicación de directrices e prácticas
óptimas para xestionar a seguridade relacionada coas operacións de BD a través da tecnoloxı́a
de computación na nube, ası́ como actualizar as directrices, marcos e estándares de seguridade
da industria. Ademais, esta tese introduce un modelo analı́tico para as medidas de seguridade
para casos de uso intensivo de datos (por exemplo, transmisión de datos de IoT á nube), den-
tro de calquera marco baseado na nube. A tese ten como obxectivo cubrir a brecha existente
entre a representación estatı́stica dos enfoques de calidade da enxeñerı́a de software e a análi-
se de aplicacións BD. Ademais, recomenda mellores prácticas e medidas á hora de construı́r
sistemas de BD tanto en nubes descentralizadas como centralizadas. O modelo e marco de
referencia proposto proporciona unha base completa e fundamental para optimizar o deseño
de sistemas BigCloud tendo, en última instancia, a seguridade no seu foco.
Palabras chave Computación na nube, nubes de vehı́culos, IoT, privacidade, contorna de
avaliación, seguridade por deseño.
Contexto
O obxectivo desta tese é mellorar o modelado, implementación e probas de seguridade da
computación na nube para facer fronte as contornas BD sen redeseñar nin modificar as súas
estruturas, buscando, ademais, incrementar a seguridade das contornas BigCloud tanto no al-
macenamento, como no movemento e o procesamento dos datos. O noso traballo sobre os
retos de seguridade no BigCloud identificou unha falta de investigacións na área de seguri-
dade no deseño de sistemas BD e na avaliación dos compoñentes de seguridade do sistema.
A figura 1.1 mostra un diagrama que ilustra a nosa visión para unha plataforma de software
BigCloud, que se presenta como unha solución tipo ”Big Data como servizo”para os des-
pregamentos de contornas BD, tanto arquitecturas centralizadas ou descentralizadas, na nube
pública.
Esta tese investiga dous dos principais problemas relacionados coa seguridade na nube
moderna, que son, por unha banda, a xestión operativa de BD en nubes centralizadas e, pola
outra, a correspondente a nubes descentralizadas. A tese combina estes dominios, ası́ como
os requisitos e as caracterı́sticas asociadas.
O primeiro problema está relacionado co cumprimento a nivel de deseño da seguridade
nas nubes centralizadas. A seguridade por deseño (security by design) estase a converterse
cada vez máis no enfoque principal de desenvolvemento, xa que busca garantir a seguridade e
a privacidade dos distintos modelos de despregamento, garantindo que o sistema foi deseñado
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dende os seus inicios para ser seguro. Este enfoque comeza buscando diferentes tácticas e
patróns de seguridade, e o mellor entre eles seleccionase e aplı́case no deseño da arquitectura,
actuando como principio director para os desenvolvedores.
O segundo aspecto analizado nesta tese está relacionado co desenvolvemento dun mar-
co de avaliación de seguridade para un dos retos máis candentes nas arquitecturas modernas
de despregamento en nubes descentralizadas, en particular, as nubes de vehı́culos, que repre-
sentan un caso especial dos Sistemas Intelixentes de Transporte (Intelligent Transportation
Systems, ITS). Este caso de uso é un exemplo de transmisión de datos (streaming) cara á nu-
be. Por último, discutiremos a realización crı́tica da seguridade por deseño, os elementos de
control de seguridade e as aproximacións para avaliación dos sistemas de computación ac-
tuais.
Computación na nube
A computación en nube está a cambiar o xeito no que a industria de TI se ofrece en em-
presas de todo o mundo. As súas caracterı́sticas inclúen a mellora da relación custe/eficiencia,
a mellora da dispoñibilidade, a aceleración da innovación, a redución do time-to-market, a
capacidade de escalar aplicacións baixo demanda e a dispoñibilidade baixo demanda de me-
llores recursos personalizados para os casos de uso. A computación en nube é considerada
un recurso crı́tico en TI para as organizacións que buscan aproveitar o poder dos analistas
de grandes datos (BDA) para mellorar a toma de decisións e a sustentabilidade empresarial.
A súa importancia reside en permitir ás organizacións escalar ou ampliar as propiedades da
infraestrutura de TI (como, por exemplo, o almacenamento de memoria ou as necesidades de
CPU) segundo as súas demandas. Ademais, a adopción da nube poderı́a axudar ás organiza-
cións a aforrar gastos innecesarios en compra, xestión e actualización de recursos de TI para
o procesamento e manipulación do BD ası́ como para o seu análise. O uso da computación
en nube xoga un papel fundamental para cambiar as responsabilidades de compra, control e
mantemento da infraestrutura e do software, que pasa de ser algo interno ás organizacións a
o seu manexo por parte de provedores de infraestruturas na nube. Este cambio ven axudando
ás organizacións a concentrarse máis no seu negocio principal, permitindo que actividades
relacionadas coas TI sexan manexadas por provedores de nube. No contexto da computación
na nube, a privacidade é unha dimensión crucial para a confianza dos clientes, tal e como xa
veñen sinalando moitos provedores de servizos.
Nubes de vehı́culos
Esta tese arroxa luz sobre a seguridade da nube de vehı́culos (Vehicular Cloud, VC) co-
xxv
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mo caso de estudo para a transmisión (streaming) de BD á nube. Unha VC é un grupo de
vehı́culos amplamente autónomos cuxos recursos de computación, detección, comunicación
e fı́sicos pódense coordinar e asignar dinámicamente para compartir acceso a Internet e, po-
lo tanto, intercambiar datos e información con outros dispositivos dentro e fóra do vehı́culo.
Unha VC pode estar formado por vehı́culos autónomos e proporciona un gran número de apli-
cacións e servizos que poden beneficiar a todo o sistema de transporte, incluı́ndo condutores,
pasaxeiros e peóns. O obxectivo de aproveitar o gran número de recursos a bordo do sistemas
de transporte, xunto coas últimas tecnoloxı́as de xestión de recursos informáticos nas nu-
bes convencionais, axudou á aparición do concepto de VC. Unha nube de vehı́culos baséase,
polo xeral, en redes ad hoc (Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, VANET), é dicir, redes sen fı́os de-
señadas especificamente para vehı́culos. Mediante estas redes se realiza a comunicación entre
os vehı́culos e outros obxectos (vehicle-to-everything, V2X), como son as infraestruturas e
outros vehı́culos.
Big Data e Hadoop
Os datos poden ser estruturados (por exemplo, rexistros médicos financeiros, electrónicos,
estatı́sticas do goberno), semiestruturados (por exemplo, texto, tweets, correos electrónicos),
non estruturados (por exemplo, audio e vı́deo) e en tempo real (por exemplo, conexións de
rede, logs de seguimento xenéricos). Todas estas aplicacións comparten o potencial de ofrecer
coñecementos inestimables se se organizan e analizan adecuadamente. A analı́tica do Big Da-
ta (BDA) permite obter enormes beneficios ao poder manexar enormes cantidades de contido
non estruturado, estruturado e semiestruturado. Non obstante, o procesamento do Big Data
pode supoñer un gran risco para moitos usuarios, debido á diversidade dos datos recollidos de
todas as fontes dispoñibles. Por outra banda, Hadoop e as súas tecnoloxı́as asociadas, é dicir,
YARN para a xestión de recursos e HDFS para almacenamento distribuı́do, veñen sendo am-
plamente utilizadas nos últimos anos como plataforma defacto para todas as cargas de traballo
BD. Estas cargas de traballo abarcan desde o procesamento por lotes, por exemplo, MapRe-
duce e o procesamento de micro-lotes (Apache Spark), ata as contornas de procesamento en
tempo real (Apache Flink ou Apache Storm). Como sistema a grande escala, a fiabilidade e a
dispoñibilidade de Hadoop supón un problema significativo, que non ven totalmente resolto
na súa implementación estándar.
Hadoop abstrae a xestión de recursos, a planificación de tarefas e a xestión de datos, man-
tendo un nivel de illamento e seguridade satisfactorio. A pila Hadoop desprégase normalmente
como parte dunha plataforma BD a grande escala baseada en hardware de baixo custe, sendo
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capaz de manexar diferentes contornas de procesamento. Baséase nunha arquitectura mes-
tre/escravo que permite controlar a xestión de datos e o acceso ao ecosistema Hadoop. A gran
comunidade detrás de Hadoop está a traballar para mellorar a súa arquitectura con vistas a
atender ás demandas e necesidades crecentes de BD. A incorporación de novas funcionalida-
des demostra a madurez e a aplicabilidade de Hadoop 3.x para servir a diferentes mercados,
o que o ten convertido nun paradigma destacable que combina nodos de computación a gran
escala para construı́r unha contorna de análise de datos, incluı́ndo o almacenamento e o pro-
cesamento de datos masivos.
Obxectivos da investigación
Hai unha necesidade crı́tica de avaliar sistemática e exhaustivamente os mecanismos imple-
mentados para cumprir os requisitos de seguridade das aplicacións BD, ası́ como de asegurarse
de eses mecanismos son a proba de fallos e se atopan dispoñibles nas contornos IaaS/PaaS. O
modelo desenvolvido nesta tese avalı́a o cumprimento, as capacidades e as limitacións dos me-
canismos de seguridade implementados nas contornas na nube. Ademais, este modelo intenta
comprobar a efectividade das contornas BD á hora de capturar os requirimentos de seguridade
dos clientes nos proceso de avaliación e valoración. Nesta tese, avaliamos o cumprimento, as
habilidades e as restricións dos mecanismos de seguridade cando se desprega unha solución
BD baseada na nube.
BigCloud presenta unha arquitectura complexa que debe ser desglosada e entendida para
avaliar os requisitos de seguridade que se espera que cumpran os métodos e controis de se-
guridade. O obxectivo é, principalmente, avaliar a capacidade da arquitectura na nube para
ofrecer un sistema que cumpra os requisitos de seguridade dos usuarios e identificar riscos
potenciais en cada compoñente das contornas BD. Ademais, é necesario desenvolver un mo-
delo de referencia que poida adaptarse para segregar arquitecturas dIaaS/PaaS en capas, de
forma que sexa posible identificar os seus compoñentes e a súa integración para proporcionar
servizos e mecanismos de seguridade na nube.
Os obxectivos principais desta tese son:
• Obxectivo 1: Facer unha análise crı́tica das plataformas BD sobre arquitecturas na nu-
be.
• Obxectivo 2: Levar a cabo unha revisión profunda dos problemas de seguridade e pri-
vacidade actuais en aplicacións/contornas Big Data baseados na nube e a clasificación
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dos seus requisitos de seguridade.
• Obxectivo 3: Acometer unha avaliación completa de diferentes técnicas sobre a segu-
ridade do servizo BD, relativa a infraestruturas, datos e aplicacións.
• Obxectivo 4: Establecer unha arquitectura baseada da seguridade da rede e identificar
os compoñentes da mesma.
• Obxectivo 5: Propoñer un modelo de análise de seguridade para plataformas Big Data,
que integre conceptos e mellores prácticas de calidade do software.
• Obxectivo 5: Formalizar abstraccións de seguridade, ademais de medidas de fiabilidade
e confianza de solucións Big Data baseadas na nube.
• Obxectivo 6: Propoñer e analizar de xeito intensivo unha contorna de avaliación da
seguridade para aplicacións de nubes de vehı́culos.
Preguntas respondidas
As preguntas crı́ticas que trata esta tese sobre a seguridade en BigCloud son:
i. Como optimizar a seguridade das contornas BD na fase de deseño das arquitecturas de
despregamento na nube.
ii. Como analizar e avaliar o nivel de seguridade dunha solución BD baseada na nube.
iii. Cales son os criterios comúns de seguridade de todos os modelos BigCloud e como
podemos optimizalos cara a modelos de transmisión de datos a gran escala.
Metodolox́ıa
O obxectivo principal do noso plan de investigación centrase na integración tanto de contornas
de procesamento de BD (por exemplo, Hadoop) como de procesamento de fluxos de datos
masivos (por exemplo, aplicacións baseadas en IoT) ao modelo de despregamento na nube,
analizando as caracterı́sticas principais, carencias de seguridade e proporcionando un modelo
de seguridade para mellorar o procesamento de datos a gran escala na nube.
Esta tese alcanzou os seus obxectivos estudando todos os retos actuais de seguridade e
privacidade impostos ao procesar as cargas de traballo asociadas a datos masivos na nube.
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Comezamos avaliando todos os requirimentos de ferramentas, aplicacións e datos para im-
plementar as solucións propostas. A continuación, definimos criterios comúns que unifican a
avaliación de seguridade de diferentes implementacións de BD e casos de uso. Despois, nos
centramos en estudar o impacto da seguridade no deseño xeral das solucións BD. Finalmente,
redactamos o noso novo marco de avaliación.
Para formalizar o contexto da tese, comezamos co estudo dos retos de seguridade na in-
tegración dos despregamentos de BD sobre infraestruturas de computación na nube. O noso
obxectivo é proporcionar unha arquitectura dependente da seguridade da rede para mello-
rar os problemas de seguridade. A continuación, buscamos definir e examinar as ferramentas
software necesarias para integrar os conceptos de enxeñarı́a baseada no modelo (model-driven
engineering) en forma dun meta-modelo, que poida ser explotado por unha aplicación de da-
tos masivos baseada na nube para ser máis consciente dos problemas de seguridade. Con este
enfoque, buscamos captar os requisitos e as capacidades de seguridade para dirixir o despre-
gamento de aplicacións, ası́ como regras de escalabilidade orientadas á seguridade para guiar
a configuración das mesmas.
Nunha terceira fase, estudamos as vulnerabilidades subxacentes de sistemas baseados na
nube co obxectivo de afrontar os seus retos. Concretamente, centrámonos en mellorar as cues-
tións de seguridade no procesamento de datos a gran escala tanto nas nubes centralizadas
como nas descentralizadas, e na seguridade das contornas BD baseadas en Cloud, tanto no
tocante ao almacenamento, ao movemento e ao procesamento. Conseguimos estes obxecti-
vos implementando as mellores directrices e prácticas para xestionar a seguridade relacionada
coas operacións de BD a través de tecnoloxı́as de computación na nube e actualizando direc-
trices, marcos e estándares de seguridade da industria. Non obstante, para establecer un marco
de avaliación, buscamos definir criterios estándar de seguridade dentro de calquera solución
de fluxo de datos para a nube. Estes criterios pódense compartir con calquera plataformas BD
a través das arquitecturas de despregamento na nube.
Unha cuarta fase inclúe o deseño e implementación da arquitectura modelo proposta para
mellorar os problemas de seguridade baseados na seguridade da plataforma/usuario BD. Ade-
mais, tamén se suxire un método para crear elementos de seguridade reutilizables que faciliten
unha especificación rápida do modelo de seguridade conforme ao meta-modelo, para reducir
o esforzo de modelado do deseñador e automatizar a xestión de seguridade das aplicacións
Big Data baseadas na nube. Mentres que na cuarta fase comezamos os experimentos de ava-
liación, para avaliar conceptualmente o rendemento do modelo, a comprobación de resultados
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tivo lugar durante a quinta fase, para modificar os modos seleccionados e editar o deseño de
arquitectura. Durante a sexta fase, realizamos unha ampla avaliación do modelo proposto e,
finalmente, na última fase, establecemos o deseño da arquitectura final e redactamos a tese.
Resultados e publicacións
Esta tese pretende explorar os criterios de seguridade no BigCloud que poden influı́r no grao
de seguridade global para o procesamento de BD sobre a nube. Enfocar os problemas de
seguridade na nube desde o punto de vista da experiencia técnica da enxeñerı́a de software
resulta de interés, ao permitir a definición de modelos de seguridade que respondan a estes
problemas.
Esta investigación contribúe á mellora do corpo de coñecemento relacionado coa segurida-
de nas nubes de vehı́culos, en primeiro lugar, examinando en detalle os bloques da arquitectura
da pila de seguridade na nube vehicular. En segundo lugar, analiza e clasifica as contornas de
seguridade de última xeración, hoxe dispoñibles principalmente como plataformas de código
aberto, para a selección de criterios sofisticados. En terceiro lugar, propón un marco de avalia-
ción rigoroso e robusto baseado na teorı́a da avaliación, que guı́a aos provedores de servizos
de VC a identificar as carencias de seguridade. Finalmente, resaltamos algúns desafı́os e reco-
mendacións abertos tanto para provedores de servizos como para clientes para unha discusión
integral con vistas ofrecer servizos seguros IoV-cloud.
A tese levou a cabo á exploración, identificación e comprensión de seis criterios comúns
de seguridade (Common Security Criteria, CSC) que habitualmente inflúen na seguridade do
BigCloud, a saber:
• Protección fı́sica e ambiental.
• Control de acceso lóxico.
• Confidencialidade das comunicacións.
• Integridade das comunicacións.
• Dispoñibilidade de datos e servizos.
• Privacidade e gobernanza de datos.
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A definición destes CSCs preséntanse segundo a aproximación baseada en análise de con-
tido dirixido das contornas de BigCloud. Estes CSCs céntranse na identificación e extracción
de criterios de seguridade que afectan ao despregamento de aplicacións BD na nube, incluı́das
as aplicacións IoT-to-cloud. Despois de comparar a semellanza e diferenzas deses criterios,
agrupáronse e etiquetáronse en subcategorı́as segundo as súas relacións. Todas as categorı́as
combináronse coa categorı́a principal concreta.
Non obstante, avaliar a confiabilidade do deseño e a implementación da seguridade é fun-
damental para a integración sostible deste paradigma. Isto pódese conseguir comprobando
regularmente os compoñentes de seguridade do VC para elaborar un plan adecuado de me-
llora. Neste sentido, presentamos un rigoroso e robusto modelo de avaliación, denominado
avaliación de confianza da nube vehicular (Trustworthiness Evaluation of Vehicular Cloud,
TrustE-VC) [10]. O marco proposto formaliza as principais ideas discutidas na literatura para
a avaliación e selección de criterios de seguridade. Os niveis esquemáticos de seguridade, a
toma de decisións multicriterios e a clasificación difusa do peso aditivo son os compoñentes
deste marco. TrustE-VC identifica os criterios estándar de seguridade, proporcionando análi-
ses das fendas de seguridade segundo un algoritmo de toma de decisións multicriterio para
apoiar as aplicacións VC como servizo de mercadorı́as na nube. Os resultados mostran que a
taxa de rendemento media de TrustE-VC e o punto ideal que describe os criterios de segurida-
de asociados a cada compoñente de VC precisan dunha mellora urxente en varios dominios.
Ademais, en función dos resultados marco, fixéronse varias recomendacións para cubrir estas
lagoas.
Por outra banda, esta tese introduce un modelo analı́tico para as medicións de seguridade,
na fase de deseño, dentro de calquera contorna BD baseada na nube. Pretende cubrir o oco
existente entre a representación estatı́stica dos enfoques de calidade da enxeñerı́a de software
e a análise da seguridade de aplicacións BD. A nosa tese recomenda as mellores prácticas e
medidas á hora de construı́r sistemas de BD en nubes descentralizadas e centralizadas. O mo-
delo proposto, polo tanto, proporciona, en última instancia, unha base completa e fundamental
para optimizar o deseño en materia de seguridade de contornas BD.
Esta tese tamén resume a relación entre o servizo de seguridade e outros servizos na nube,
ası́ como as súas funcións. Ofrecemos unha solución á pregunta principal de investigación, que
trata dos elementos de seguridade asociados ao despregamento de aplicacións BD na nube. A
nosa solución está formada por actores principais que destacan a separación de intereses con
respecto á funcionalidade do servizo (seguridade do servizo de datos, seguridade IaaS, etc.) e
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os requisitos de seguridade non funcionais ao comezo do deseño, a través dun enfoque e espe-
cificacións baseadas na reutilización. Ademais, propoñemos un patrón de análise de segurida-
de que refina o patrón de deseño de contexto da nube en sinerxia cunha trı́ada CIA estendida
(CIA refı́rese á confidencialidade, integridade e dispoñibilidade dos datos), proporcionando
un conxunto de directrices para a estruturación das especificacións dos BD, que relaciona un
deseño na nube co seu contorno de seguridade. Finalmente, suxerimos un método de elección
estruturado para a selección de aspectos de seguridade especı́ficos do BigCloud que propor-
ciona achegas valiosas sobre as contornas de vangarda, mediante a asignación á cada dominio
de seguridade da súa solución coñecida.
Publicacións
A continuación, presentamos unha lista de publicacións en revistas revisadas por pares e con-
ferencias de alto impacto derivadas do traballo desenvolvido nesta tese.
Articles in international conferences:
• Mohammad N. Aladwan, Feras M. Awaysheh, Mamoun Alazab, J. C. Cabaleiro, T.
F. Pena, and M. Alazab, “Common security criteria for vehicular clouds and internet
of vehicles evaluation and selection,” in 2019 18th IEEE International Conference On
Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications/13th IEEE Internatio-
nal Conference On Big Data Science And Engineering (TrustCom/BigDataSE). IEEE,
2019, pp. 807–813 GGS Rating: B-
Artigos en conferencias internacionais:
• Mohammad N. Aladwan, Feras M. Awaysheh, Sadi Alawadi, Mamoun Alazab, Tomás
F. Pena, José C. Cabaleiro “TrustE-VC: Trustworthy Evaluation Framework for Indus-
trial Connected Vehicles in the Cloud” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,
16(9):6203-6213, 2020. Os dous primeiros autores contribuı́ron en igual medida nesta
publicación. Impact factor (JCR 2018): 7.377 (Q1). Ranking 1/46 na categorı́a EN-
GINEERING, INDUSTRIAL.
Artigos en revisión:
• Feras M. Awaysheh, Mohammad Aladwan, Tomás F. Pena, José C. Cabaleiro “Security
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Cloud computing has recently emerged as a reliable, trustworthy, and cost-benefit model in
the large-scale data analytics industry. Numerous IT vendors are offering computation, stor-
age, and application hosting services in response to the rapidly increased amounts of available
data to be known as Big Data (BD). Processing BD over cloud configurations is a recently in-
vestigated technology, and it has many gaps in security and privacy. Cloud clients are not
sure of the security techniques implemented and how they are integrated to provide sufficient
security for their data and applications. The research community, therefore, must understand
and evaluate security mechanisms and controls implemented to maintain the availability, in-
tegrity, and confidentiality of data processed, stored, and accessed in the cloud. Also, there is
a need to ensure that these mechanisms meet security standards and requirements to mitigate
any security risks. The research community must consider these issues by proposing robust
protection techniques that enable getting benefits from BD without risking privacy.
In general, cloud computing paradigm is constructed based on several technologies such
as virtualization, container technology, Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), and utility com-
puting, involving three main service layers, namely, Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-
as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Security aspects are essential in
motivating clients to adopt cloud computing services. A survey on cloud challenges illustrates
that security is the main barrier and obstacle to widespread adoption of cloud computing for
BD services [102]
The focus of this research is to enhance the security modeling, implementation, and test-
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Figure 1.1: BigCloud abstracted layers and architecture.
ing of cloud computing to cope with the BD environment without redesigning or modify-
ing its IaaS structures. Also, toward improving Cloud-based Big Data (simply BigCloud)
frameworks security in storage, motion, and process. The investigation of BigCloud secu-
rity challenges, detailed in the next sections, identifies a research gap in the area of security
by design of BD systems and how to evaluate the system security components. Figure 1.1
shows a diagram that illustrates our vision for the BigCloud software platform as a “Big Data
as a Service” for Big Data frameworks deployments, whether centralized and decentralized
architectures in the public cloud.
This thesis researches two main problems related to modern cloud security, as illustrated
in the tree diagram in Figure 1.2 that illustrates the scope of this research. It also illustrates the
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Figure 1.2: Modelling the thesis structure and components.
research flow between the thesis domains as well as the associated requirements and features.
The first problem is related to meeting centralized cloud security at the design level. Security
by Design [66] is increasingly becoming the mainstream development approach to ensure
the security and privacy of different deployment systems. It indicates that the system has
been designed from the foundation to be secure. In such an approach, the alternate security
tactics and patterns are first thought; among them, the best is selected and enforced by the
architecture design, and then used as guiding principles for developers.
The second problem discussed in this thesis is related to developing a security evaluation
framework for one of the most trending challenges in the modern decentralized cloud de-
ployments architectures, in particular, the vehicular clouds that represent a special case of the
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). This use-case represents a data streaming approach
3
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towards the cloud. Also, we discuss the critical realization of security by design, security
control elements, and an evaluation approach in the modern computer science.
1.2 Overview: Supporting Concepts
Cloud-based services are gaining more recognition in the IoT applications, thanks to the ev-
ergrowing cellular network technology. Several research works aim at integrating cloud com-
puting with different industries. Herein, we provide an overview of the supporting concepts,
and we define the thesis use-cases.
• Vehicular Cloud (VC).
VC refers to a group of broadly autonomous vehicles whose corporate computing, sens-
ing, communication, and physical resources can be coordinated and dynamically allo-
cated to share internet access, and hence data, with other devices both inside and out-
side the vehicle. The VC can be formed by autonomous vehicles and provides a vast
number of applications and services that can benefit the entire transportation system,
as well as drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. The intent to utilize the excessive on-
board resources in the transportation system, along with the latest computing resource
management technology in conventional clouds, has cultivated the concept of the VC.
In general, it is composed of (i) Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET), which is a
wireless ad hoc network of mobile vehicles, in which communication can be between
vehicle and vehicle (V2V) or vehicle and roadside infrastructure (V2I). (ii) Connected
vehicles that interact with each other (V2V), the roadside infrastructure (V2I), and be-
yond Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) via wireless communications. (iii) Cloud computing
service provider to support many novel applications.
• IoT-to-Cloud paradigm.
As the Internet of Things (IoT) has grown in popularity, modern cloud computing
providers have begun offering IoT-specific features. These features could provide IoT
developers with much aid, make it an essential part of the modern IoT applications.
Nowadays, we can see more and more emerging IoT applications on the market that
have the cloud as back-end. The reason for this trend is the enormous benefit that the
cloud computing paradigm provides to IoT. These benefits include but not limited to
scalability (computing and storage), data mobility (and accessibility from anywhere),
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cost-effectiveness (pay as you use), and many more features. Thus, IoT and cloud
computing was a natural pairing, enabling advanced predictive analytics, historical data
analysis, and automation, the likes of which the world has never seen before. When
paired with edge computing, the cloud offers the most significant business benefit and
facilitates data integration.
1.3 Motivation
In this thesis, we establish a security framework relying on the common security criteria
within the BD platforms over the cloud deployment architectures. This framework aims at
improving cloud vulnerabilities and hence addresses its challenges. Specifically, we examine
the common features and the security challenges of this integration to provide an architecture
relying on the security of the network. We focus on improving the large-scale data processing
security issues in both the centralized and decentralized clouds, and the Cloud-based Big Data
frameworks security in storage, motion, and process. We achieve these goals by implementing
the best guidelines and practices for managing security related to BD operations over cloud
computing technology and updating industry security guidelines, frameworks, and standards.
1.4 Problem statement
Cloud computing is changing the way IT industry is delivered in enterprises around the world;
it is consumed and managed, improving cost efficiencies, availability, accelerated innovation,
faster time-to-market, and the ability to scale applications on demand. On the other hand,
BD analytics allows getting enormous benefits by dealing with any massive volume of un-
structured, structured, and semi-structured content. However, BD processing represents a
high risk for many users due to the various data gathered from all available sources. The
Apache Hadoop ecosystem had been widely used in the last years as a defacto platform for all
BD workloads. These workloads are spanning from batch-processing, e.g., Hadoop MapRe-
duce1 and Apache Spark2 to real-time processing frameworks, e.g., Apache Flink3 or Apache
Storm4. As a large-scale system, Hadoop reliability and availability are significant issues not







Nowadays, cloud deployment architectures have become a preferable computation model
of BD operations. Their scalability, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness motivated this trend. In
this context, the data is no longer physically maintained under the user’s direct control, which
raises new security concerns. Security management plays a decisive role as either compliance
or promotes widespread adoption and acceptance. However, it is challenging to develop a
comprehensive security plan and design unless it is based on the results of a preliminary anal-
ysis that ensures a realistic secure assembly and addresses domain vulnerabilities. Employing
software engineering technical expertise to address cloud security concerns can sustain this
tendency by drafting security models that address these concerns. Recent literature lacks a
technology-independent reference architecture for BD systems that sheds light on security
by design. Furthermore, a proper definition of the security components that is responsible
for delivering reference modules, basic requirements, and central system characteristics of a
BD-cloud environment are required. Doing so will demonstrate how to use this model in the
development of effective BD security-solutions and evaluation frameworks.
Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming increasingly crucial to intelligent transportation sys-
tem stakeholders, including cloud-based vehicular cloud (VC) and internet of vehicles (IoV)
paradigms. This new trend involves communication and data exchange between several ob-
jects within different layers of control. Security in such a deployment is pivotal to realize
the general IoT-based smart city. However, the evaluation of the degree of security regarding
these paradigms remains a challenge. This study aims to discover and identify common secu-
rity criteria (CSC) from a context-based analysis pattern and, later, to discuss, compare, and
aggregate a conceptual model of CSC impartially. A privacy granularity classification that
maintains data confidentiality is proposed alongside the security selection criteria.
The integration between cloud computing and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs),
namely, vehicular clouds (VCs), has become a significant research area. The trustworthiness
in VCs is expected to carry more computing capabilities that manage large-scale collected
data. This trend requires a need for a security evaluation framework that ensures data pri-
vacy protection, the integrity of information, and the availability of resources. Evaluating the
trustworthiness of the security design and implementation is vital for the sustainable integra-
tion of such a paradigm. This evaluation can be achieved by regularly checking the security
components of the VC to devise an adequate plan for improvement. Any development in
this sector will require a rigorous and robust evaluation model. This problem demands to




The scope of this thesis is restricted to big data frameworks and applications over Cloud
environments with its applications. The work, however, is considered suitable for the evalua-
tion and analysis of the cloud environment and the security controls implemented on the cloud
service in general. The research scope is in line with the shared security and management re-
sponsibilities between cloud service providers and their customers. This thesis is focused on
ensuring that BigCloud customer security requirements are maintained by the environment
surrounding BD application as in IoT-to-Cloud systems.
1.5 Aims and objectives
There is a critical need to systematically and comprehensively evaluate the security mecha-
nisms implemented to meet the security requirements of BD applications over cloud environ-
ments. In this thesis we assesses the compliance, capabilities, and limitations of the security
mechanism implemented in the cloud environment. Also, we attempts to test the effectiveness
of the framework in capturing customer security requirements in the evaluation and assess-
ment process.
The Cloud presents a complex architecture that needs to be broken down and understood
to evaluate security requirements that are expected to be met by security methods and con-
trols. Mainly, this objective aims to evaluate cloud architecture’s ability to deliver a system
that fulfills the users’ security requirements and to identify potential risks on each component
of the BD frameworks. Also, it is required a developed reference model that can be adapted to
segregate IaaS/PaaS cloud architectures into layers in an attempt to identify its components,
and how these components integrate to provide cloud services and security mechanisms im-
plemented in the cloud.
The primary goals of this thesis are:
• Objective 1 A critical evaluation of BD platforms over cloud architectures.
• Objective 2 A thorough review of current security and privacy issues in cloud-based
Big Data applications/frameworks and their security requirements mapping and classi-
fication.
• Objective 3 A comprehensive evaluation of different techniques regarding BD service
security, concerning infrastructure, data, and application.
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• Objective 4 To establish an architecture relying on the security of the network and
identify the framework components.
• Objective 5 To formalize security abstraction, besides reliability and trust measure-
ments of cloud-based Big Data solutions.
• Objective 6 To propose and intensively evaluate a security evaluation framework for
vehicular cloud applications.
1.6 Thesis Contribution
This thesis has successfully achieved the targeted objectives listed in section 1.5 and has
achieved the following contributions:
1. The first contribution of this thesis is composing a reference architecture that summa-
rizes the relationship between the security service and other cloud services as well as
their functions. Also, we offer a solution to the main research question, which deals
with the security elements associated with BD deployment over the IaaS cloud model.
Our solution consists of main actors that emphasize the separation of concerns regarding
the service functionality (data service security, IaaS security, etc.) and non-functional
security requirements at the beginning of the design, through a reuse-based approach
and specifications. Moreover, we propose a security analysis pattern that refines the
cloud context-pattern in synergy to an extended CIA triad5, providing a set of guide-
lines for the structuring of BD specifications, which relates a cloud design to its security
environment. Finally, we suggest a structured election method for BigCloud-specific se-
curity selection that delivers many insights regarding the latest ongoing developments
and cutting-edge frameworks by mapping each security domain to its solution knowl-
edge.
2. The second contribution of this thesis is to review and further discuss the various criteria
that influence the degree of security in the Vehicular Clouds (VC) context. The thesis
first outlines a conceptual model that provides an overview of the criteria influencing
both the client and provider security formation. Next, it creates a security analysis pat-
tern that envisions VC to have both back-end data aggregation channels (e.g., Message
5The CIA triad refers to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data
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Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) broker) and edge/fog data services to supple-
ment the sensor mesh network (e.g., VANET) and the cloud architecture layers. It also
represents VC privacy as a multi-criteria construct affecting the data life cycle.
This research concludes that the majority of current VC systems fail to provide the
security level for their system. We also advocate that, when evaluation and selection
are realized, VCs can lead to a significant enhancement in the system security that
sustains its adoption by the clients. Thus, we explore the various criteria that influence
the security degree in the Internet-of-Vehicles (IoV) to the cloud context.
3. The third contribution of this thesis is providing practical analysis for security by de-
sign of cloud-based IoT and VC systems. Ensuring sustainable security integration of
industrial VCs in the cloud environment with systematic security evaluation and se-
lection has been limited in this context. This thesis investigates a VC evaluation to
offer assurances of the functional security properties of VC deployment architectures.
The proposed framework expresses imprecise trust evaluation information to facilitate
decision making within industrial VC environments.
This goal provides a theoretical contribution by categorizing the security evaluation
criteria in VC based on the evaluation theory. It is also proposing a better security
criteria selection with a fuzzy evaluation and ranking technique to evaluate and clas-
sify the unimproved security vulnerabilities in IoV-to-cloud deployment architectures.
Therefore, it ensures the trustworthiness of the VC environment.
1.7 Outlines
This thesis is dedicated to solving the centralized cloud security challenges as well as the
IoT-to-Cloud data streaming security challenges. Figure 1.3 represent the thesis structure and
its components. The first problem is related to the centralized deployment models, where we
propose modeling the security specifications in the security by design in Chapter 2. A refer-
ence architecture (RA), an analysis pattern (AP), and a component diagram (CD) as security
elements of the solution requirements are the main components of this chapter.
The decentralized architectures, i.e., large-scale distributed systems as in a typical IoT-to-
cloud security criteria, are discussed in Chapter 3. The specification domain includes both,
security control elements for evaluation and election, and a robust evaluation framework of
these security control elements within any deployment system. The security control requires
9
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Figure 1.3: Mapping the thesis research components to the thesis outlines.
a comprehensive classification criteria for all of the security components and features, as
well as a selection criteria among a set of these security features. An evaluation framework
that employs a multi-criteria decision-making algorithm, a fuzzy set modeling approach, and
a simple adaptive weight mechanism is presented in Chapter 4. This framework aims at
identifying a unified repository of standard security criteria and an evaluation approach of
them.
This research introduces an analytical model for BD security measurements within any
cloud-based framework. It is aiming to fill the existing gap between the statistical represen-
tation of quality approaches of software engineering and the analysis of securing BD applica-
tions. Also, this work recommends best practices and measurements when constructing BD
systems in both centralized and decentralized clouds. The proposed model, thus, provides




SECURITY BY DESIGN: CONCEPTS AND
IMPLEMENTATIONS
2.1 Introduction
In this new digital era, many companies use cloud technology to store, process, and ana-
lyze petabytes of both structured and non-structured data relating to their business and cus-
tomers [54]. Advancements in cloud computing (or simply cloud) technology have shaped the
modern application delivery model [113]. The advantages of adopting cloud computing are
inarguable due to its great potential to provide cheap and straightforward access to substan-
tial computing power. This paradigm shifts the location of the datacenter to an off-premise
location, with the potential of higher substantial scalability and elasticity than traditional mod-
els. Big data (BD) frameworks over cloud computing (BigCloud) promote the transference of
data to off-premise datacenters. As the outsourced data usually contain confidential informa-
tion, such as sensitive financial records, proprietary research data, healthcare data, or sensitive
government information, information classification and security become even more critical.
Fulfilling the highest security and data protection requirements among all cloud delivery
layers is a common objective. Nevertheless, ensuring the security properties of computation
outsourcing to the cloud can be challenging. For this reason, security and privacy of data man-
agement are among the cloud’s leading next-decade research directions [30]. This research
direction aims to maintain the efficiency of sustainable BD operations over cloud systems.
The main security challenge pertains to the client’s trust in data transfer in and out of
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Figure 2.1: BigCloud Security by design domain
the cloud environment as well as the storing and processing of critical data within an off-
premise datacenter. Some fundamental characteristics of the cloud (such as multitenancy and
virtualization) ensure better utilization of resources, but make it challenging to deliver secure
computation. Other security threats associated with this adoption include privacy, integrity,
confidentiality, and the availability of stored data, which are magnified by the properties of
BD systems (i.e., volume, velocity, and variety) [54].
Numerous public cloud service providers deliver their service within different layers, such
as infrastructure, platform, and software-as-a-service (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS). This study focuses
on the IaaS cloud, where both the user and the service provider share the responsibility for
their BD stages —data-at-rest, data-in-transit, and data-in-process security. Our research do-
main is distributed over three main computer science fields, namely, big data, cloud com-
puting, and software engineering as represented in Figure 2.1. In this regard, a reference
architecture (RA) that illustrates security components in the context of the BigCloud concep-
tual model will ensure the representation of the problem domain (i.e., security, reliability, and
privacy). This representation serves as a mechanism to transfer knowledge of security mod-
eling and software engineering tools to that problem domain. It also serves as a knowledge
capture, which contains both domain knowledge (e.g., using cases and scenarios) and solution
knowledge (e.g., mapping current technologies) that present the domain under study.
2.1.1 Contribution
This work contributes to the adoption of secure IaaS cloud models as scalable BD deployment
architectures by taking the following measures:
• Foregrounding the security components and essential qualities of a BigCloud frame-
work;
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• Mapping and categorizing current security technologies onto the concerns;
• Defining domain concepts based on the grouping of relevant concerns into an architec-
tural reference module that facilitates the design of security systems;
• Demonstrating how to utilize the reference architecture as an effective medium to create
and evaluate secure BigCloud systems with a sufficient trust level.
2.1.2 Organization
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 presents a general review of the chap-
ter’s scope and background alongside the methodology and related work. Section 2.3 outlines
the reference architecture as part of the cloud security management. Section 2.4 provides
a component diagram of BigCloud security processes and attributes. Further, Section 2.5
discusses security-related considerations, including service-delivery, security and data ser-
vice security. Section 2.7.1 discusses converging this study’s results in a security evaluation
framework. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2 Background
Big data platforms use an architectural pattern that guides data-intensive solutions to create,
organize, and reuse their computing components. Meanwhile, cloud computing is a set of
enabling technologies that provide broader services and more flexible solutions for enterprises
to deploy their frameworks. This section discusses the relationship between BD platforms and
cloud computing service providers. Further, it introduces the methodology and motivation
behind this work. Finally, it discusses related work.
2.2.1 BigCloud
Historically, big data deployment architectures have been designed as shared-nothing archi-
tecture with enough capacity to meet peak demands. However, this architecture could result in
the system underutilizing its capacity that organizations must still pay for. On the other hand,
once the system’s capacity has been reached, a significant investment in time, resources, and
money to expand it is expected. Modern industry and academia require “utility” services,




The advent of cloud-based clusters promotes implementing a cloud solution to support BD
operations. This approach grants a practical solution that not only tackles this challenge but
also enhances the system’s scalability, reduces maintenance cost, and increases the efficiency
of resource management. Over the years, cloud service providers have offered a wide range
of BD-supporting services spanning from storage to processing and analyzing vast amounts
of datasets. Examples include public-service providers (e.g., Amazon EMR [12], Microsoft
Azure HDInsight [82], and Google Cloud Dataproc [49]) and private BD vendors (e.g., Cloud-
era [34] and MapR [78]).
2.2.2 Motivation and Methodology
This work aims at facilitating the realization of secure BD systems in the IaaS cloud model.
When a BigCloud system is realized, important security considerations arise. These security
factors include the architectural design of the system and the underlying security technolo-
gies and policies/services. IaaS continues to be the fastest growing model [77] and the most
preferred by many BD implementers. The main goal of this thesis chapter is to analyze the
security services used in Iaas cloud environments and describes BD security items and rela-
tionships amongst them. It discusses security systems oriented to BigCloud design in order to
present their glossary and landscape techniques and to define research gaps and best practices.
Figure 2.2 describes the methodology employed in this study to deliver a generic BigCloud
security reference model.
In detail, this study contributes to the BigCloud security deployment body of knowledge
by, first, extensively examining the building blocks of the cloud security stack for supporting
BD science. In addition, it classifies the different layers of security based on their supported
service models into a reference architecture. Second, it examines the vulnerabilities associ-
ated with BigCloud adoption by providing the security components of a secure design pattern
and its attributes. Third, it provides various insights into BigCloud security specifications by
refining the cloud context-pattern into a novel security analysis pattern. This pattern maps
the current technologies to the solution domain by extending the CIA (Confidentiality, In-
tegrity, and Availability) triad. Next, it analyzes and classifies the state-of-the-art security
frameworks available today mostly as open-source for a detailed criteria election. Finally, it
highlights some open challenges and recommendations for both service providers and cus-
tomers, for a comprehensive discussion towards achieving the vision of providing a secure
BigCloud service. To facilitate using the systematic research methodology, we summarize
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Figure 2.2: A graphical representation of systematic research methodology for modeling and
implementing a security solution for BigCloud adoption. The abbreviations and (*) signs
represent the chapter scope, and they are further described in Table 2.1
the proposed models and patterns in Table 2.1, which consists of the knowledge domain, its
model description, and its designated section within this study.
2.2.3 Related Work
The literature has suggested different Cloud-driven meta-models to support cloud application
management. In [52], Hamdaqa et al. propose a service-oriented architecture that captures
design elements, configuration rules, and a semantic interpretation of cloud applications in a
meta-model. Their work meets the goals of this chapter in that both works aim to standard-
ize cloud-modeling language by drafting reference models. However, the proposed model
of this study formalizes cloud security’s vocabulary and semantics, which assists in develop-
ing a secure BD service-oriented model and suitable cloud runtime security support. In the
context of the cloud-security meta-model, the authors in [67] present an integrated domain-
specific language coupled with a basic security model that promotes the designers’ modeling
effort. Furthermore, the work by [119] provides two use-case studies to verify the usability
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BCRA Preparation BigCloud Reference Architecture with
different service layers and security ser-
vices that describes the security issues




BCSC Initialization BigCloud Security Component that re-
views the primary components as of se-
curity design pattern with security at-





BCSAP Examination BigCloud Security Analysis Pattern that
reviews the bases for building a secure
ecosystem during the analysis phase and
describes the basic structure and risks to
be considered while applying the solu-




SCS Selection Security Criteria Selection that reviews
the various criteria that influence secu-
rity in a BigCloud context, and describes





of their meta-model. Nevertheless, none of the previous studies consider BD-specific security
requirements of IaaS cloud deployment architecture as is proposed by this study.
A recently established NIST BD security Sub-Working Group (NBDs-WG) [87] addresses
the importance of security and privacy measurements, definitions, requirements, and charac-
teristics of BD systems. The mutual relationship amongst BD technologies and model-driven
engineering (represented by software engineering) is investigated in [21]. In [90], Pekka and
Pakkala analyze published implementations of BD architectures (e.g., Netflix, Linkedin, and
Facebook) to draft a reference architecture. In doing so, they aim to map different BD so-
lutions that facilitate designing BD systems and create a classification of BD technologies,
products, and services. In [37], the authors extensively illustrate BD ecosystem components
based on the NBD interoperability framework. Their architecture framework consists of BD
infrastructure, BD analytics, data structures and models, BD lifecycle management, and BD
security. However, they do not investigate cloud-specific security requirements, components,
or delivery within an IaaS cloud as this study proposes.
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2.3 BigCloud Security Reference Architecture
Many security threats regarding BigCloud platforms can be mitigated using traditional secu-
rity processes and techniques. However, some security threats require cloud-specific solu-
tions. BD frameworks have different security vulnerabilities and may be exposed to various
threats. Thus, in addition to setting BigCloud security service requirements and components
of data storage, it is significant to define whose responsibility it is to protect them. Therefore,
we specify a vocabulary of design elements associated with BigCloud actors (system compo-
nents) by presenting the BigCloud Reference Architecture (BCRA), which outlines the main
components of cloud applications. BCRA summarizes the relationship between the security
service and other cloud services as well as their functions. Further, the BCRA model defines
a set of implementational requirements and characteristics that can be used for orchestrating
a secure BigCloud ecosystem. Therefore, it relates to companion security requirements and
features that are the basis for designing a reliable BigCloud implementation. Figure 2.3 illus-
trates the five major cloud actors of the BCRA framework, excluding the client itself: service
delivery, management, auditing, data, and security services. Section 2.3.2 further presents the
characteristics used, as well as standards for describing BigCloud security in detail, whereas
Section 2.4 and 2.5 present BigCloud security-specific elements and considerations, respec-
tively.
2.3.1 BigCloud reference architecture components
In general, BD reference architectures within the field of software architecture aims to provide
a template solution for an architecture for BD domain. It also provides a common vocabulary
with which to discuss implementations, often with the aim to stress commonality. In this
chapter we introduce the components of the BigCloud reference architecture.
1. Client Security: An entity (organization or user) that has a formal contract or arrange-
ment to maintain a business relationship with a cloud provider to use IT resources and
other services made available by the provider. The cloud client security complements
the providers’ security and components. The client accesses the service by applying a
session that defines interaction security, using service level agreement (SLA) and poli-
cies. The session establishes client permissions and log method, and it even configures
session timeout values. These sessions have the effect of mirroring services across all
layers and system components. Assuring the session’s availability regardless of whether
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Figure 2.3: The reference architecture as part of the security management of BigCloud speci-
fication development.
there is an attack (e.g., denial of service) or a system failure is in the BigCloud service
provider’s interest, along with securing access, user identification, and authentication.
Providing the needed level of training and awareness among users (such as strong pass-
words) are considered a common interest for both the client and provider.
2. Service delivery: This represents the three types of cloud delivery models in the form
of layer abstractions: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS),
and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Figure 2.3 shows how each layer defines its role
(operation and function) within the BD stack. These roles require input and interaction
between customers and the service provider. The service delivery layers serve as a
simplified translation of business demand into technology and operational capabilities.
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The service delivery model is shaped and presented from a BD viewpoint. It focuses on
the BD framework service delivery as cloud-service abstraction layers.
In an IaaS deployment, the capabilities are split into hardware, network, and runtime
environment. Fundamental computing resources, such as CPU, RAM, and bandwidth,
are at the base of the IaaS cloud. While the runtime environment can deploy and run
arbitrary software that includes operating systems (OS), virtual machines (VM), and
containers, the client does not control the underlying infrastructure but has limited
control to select networking components (e.g., host firewalls and virtual networks).
Modern BD schedulers utilize the containers as a runtime environment of their applica-
tions [114, 55].
PaaS deployment describes the relationship between the cloud provider and the cloud
client. The capability granted to the client is to deploy applications using libraries,
programs, services, and tools established by the provider. The development environ-
ment consumes the runtime services (VM, etc.) from the previous layer, so the user
has administrative rights over deployed applications and configuration settings for the
application-hosting environment. For instance, a client can select the BD platform (e.g.,
Apache Hadoop [35]) and the execution engine (e.g., MapReduce [36] for a batch query,
Spark [122] for micro-batch, or Storm [111] for real-time processing).
Finally, the SaaS deployment layer provides high-level capabilities such as post-proces-
sing operations and visualization capabilities. However, the client does not manage or
control the cloud infrastructure and the development or runtime capabilities. For this
reason, only the cloud service provider is responsible for efficiency and security.
3. Management services: The capabilities that enable the management of the service-
delivery model. Typically, these are services to which the provider connects rather than
the client. They refer to a set of services designed to ensure that other cloud compo-
nents are working optimally for BD framework operations. Moreover, management
services present an entity that manages the operation and interaction between the client
and the cloud provider. Thus, it is critical to maintain the same security levels for the
service delivery layer as for large-scale security monitoring [79] and continuous system-
security auditing [73], while retaining authentication and authorization access control.
The cloud provider must assure and maintain overall proactive security governance of
management services. Different BD frameworks can be implemented to harness man-
19
MOHAMMAD NASER ALADWAN
agement services, for instance, Apache Zookeeper1 for BD ecosystem orchestration or
Apache Ambari2 for cluster deployment and provision service.
4. Auditing services: This includes the assessment of cloud services, operations, perfor-
mance, and security auditing of cloud implementation [79]. It also assures system avail-
ability, quality of service, and recovery plans. Security auditing defines and reports on
security policies (e.g., password complexity levels). Furthermore, it evaluates recovery
policies and the quality of security services while maintaining the reporting of secu-
rity incidents. A multi-replica dynamic auditing of public multi-tenant data storage on
cloud computing is reported in [74].
5. Data services: The underlying data service provides storage capacities on demand, ei-
ther within virtual disk drives using a hypervisor and containers or with direct access
to physical storage. The tasks associated with these services include all data stages,
from data collection (generating structured or unstructured data) to data in rest within
file systems (FS), databases (DB), and object storage (OSt) as illustrated in the Fig-
ure 2.3. These services also include data movement, also known as data placement,
from storage to virtual machines and vice versa and other data operations and process-
ing services, such as storing meta-data. The importance of these services is magnified
in data-intensive batch-based systems (e.g., Hadoop MapReduce). Since data must
materialize in storage before the process can begin, these services must provide the ca-
pability to backup and restore data by establishing data protection policies at the service
layer.
6. Security services: They define a broad set of technologies, policies, and controls de-
ployed to protect data, services, applications, and the associated infrastructure resources
of cloud computing. By managing the on-going delivery of security, these services rep-
resent the capabilities of the security life cycle. The RA verifies that the BigCloud
security is a cross-cutting interest that influences all the components in the model.
2.3.2 BigCloud Security Characteristics
Due to its inherently remote operations, resources co-tenancy, distributed management, and
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is crucial. Customers do not have direct control over the systems that consume their data
because of the cloud’s black-box nature. The following are the most pressing challenges in
assessing data protection before a move to the public cloud:
• Data residency: This refers to the physical geographic location of the data stored in
the cloud. In conventional BD systems, such as on-premise clusters, the geolocation of
data is always known and, thus, controlled. When deploying a BigCloud system, the
physical location of the data is no longer known or fully trusted. Data residency also
includes data flow, file locations, and data input/output.
• Data privacy: This describes the ability to limit data sharing in BigCloud systems,
including third parties through an organization or individuals. Maintaining an appro-
priate data privacy level can be achieved by exploring various technologies and tools,
including encryption [71] and virtual mapping [32]. Other solutions include modifying
policies and legislation to prevent unauthorized access or use of data. However, defin-
ing legal ownership, responsibilities, and privileges of data between owner and data
custodian can alleviate privacy threats.
• Data ownership: A serious concern within BigCloud data processing is data owner-
ship. When clients transfer their data to the cloud, the primary processor of that data
is then not the physical owner but the provider. Consequently, a new threat parameter
is raised regarding trust in that provider. Clients cannot be sure how the cloud system
manipulates their data or whether the processing complies with their demands.
2.4 BigCloud Security Component Model
Any model consists of a vocabulary of design elements, a set of configuration rules, and
a semantic interpretation. The technology-agnostic BigCloud Security Component (BCSC)
model represented in Figure 2.4 is a logical extension of BD application security in cloud
computing definition. As highlighted earlier, BCSC is a generic, high-level conceptual model
that facilitates the understanding of the successful implementation of trusted BD in a cloud
environment. From this perspective, it summarizes operational intricacies and component in-
teraction of BigCloud security. The BCSC does not represent the system architecture of a
specific cloud vendor. Instead, it is a framework for describing, evaluating, and developing
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Figure 2.4: BCSC diagram as a structure of software design pattern with associated security
attributes.
a system-specific architecture using a shared cloud security component of reference models,
along with their activities and functions. This actor-based model is intended to serve de-
signers by representing the overall view of roles and responsibilities for the assessment and
management of risk by implementing security components and controls.
The BCSC model specification relies on the predefined BigCloud RA components de-
scribed in Section 2.3 By analyzing these components, we conceptualized a BCSC model
to represent the implementation of security-specific techniques and sub-components. The
proposed model demonstrates the security process and attributes (actions) that influence,
and are influenced by, the BCSC and describes the structural relationships among them. In
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fact, the BCSC model is a logical design constructed with replicable items (i.e., the sub-
components and security techniques can be modified according to use-case). This approach
ensures reuse and substitutes these components and actions within any BigCloud application
security design. It also offers the architects a reference model to verify that the installed se-
curity plan/design meets their system security functionality. Moreover, it can be utilized as a
communication tool for various development groups, as well as project stakeholders and im-
plementation staff, as it provides a high-level, architectural view of BigCloud security. This
model assists considerably in formalizing the implementation roadmap for security integra-
tion.
The BCSC model consists of five main components: client, data service, management
service, auditing service, and IaaS service-delivery security. Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 further
discuss security-related considerations of targeted sub-components. The BCSC model is also
composed of three security processes and two aggregation points. These processes (described
in Section 2.5.3) represent a set of techniques, tools, and methodologies to achieve their goals.
On the other hand, the aggregation points facilitate the diagram with a decent and uncomplex
view. The BCSC aggregation point, located in the center of the model, resembles integral
components (i.e., it can be implemented among all of them). The relationship between com-
ponents and other entities is represented by two independent arrows, where the arrowhead
connects with the provider. The continuous arrow resembles the entities’ interactions (or in-
fluence), while the dashed arrows represent the client’s interaction.
2.5 BigCloud Security-related considerations
This study offers an extensive analysis of BigCloud IaaS service delivery and data-service
security. However, due to the vast research area, an in-depth examination of management, au-
diting and client service security are not within its research scope. These items offer material
for future work or an open research direction. Herein, we examine the implication and re-
mediation of the most relevant security components in the BigCloud paradigm: IaaS service-
delivery security and data-service security. This section discusses other security consider-
ations and processes when implementing a BD system within a cloud development model.
These security threats mainly originate from issues such as multi-tenancy, loss of control over
data, and trust [47].
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2.5.1 IaaS Service-delivery Security
The Cloud service delivery model represents the technology stack in which each layer pro-
vides services to the layer above. In this context, IaaS provides the base to deliver other
services with the cloud model, e.g., PaaS and SaaS. The reference model categorizes security
services among the IaaS layer to a runtime environment or hardware and network compo-
nents. The BCSC diagram in Figure 2.4 specifies these components in detail by charting out
the IaaS service-delivery layer as follows:
• Hardware security: Hardware resources (e.g., CPU caches, GPUs, and RAM) deliver
their services in a scalable way by sharing infrastructure. The underlying resources
that provide this infrastructure were not often designed to offer robust isolation fea-
tures for multi-tenant architecture. A virtualization hypervisor or container mediates
access between guest operating systems and these computing resources are utilized to
address this issue. Security measures should still be employed to ensure that individual
customers do not impact the processes of other tenants operating on the same cloud
provider.
• Network security: Provides the network connection that supports IT activity, which
includes network fabric, virtual local area networks (VLAN), connectivity, and seg-
mentation. Network services are responsible for delivering clients’ data to storage ca-
pacities and linking system components. They also support a secure movement of BD
meta-data and pass the workload to the process units among all service-delivery layers.
Connection security is a critical factor in securing the delivery of services, as network
and communication carriers provide the distribution of any BigCloud services. Due to
its significance, the network architecture design should treat client connections with a
minimal level of trust. Clients will always access cloud services using a remote network
connection. A set of security measures should be employed to mitigate channels (and
network services such as DNS) that transmit data to and from cloud structures. Secure
sockets layer, transport layer security encryption, and VPN technologies are examples.
Firewalls should also deny any attempts to access a BigCloud service from a session
that should not be connected to that service.
• Hypervisor and container security: Virtualization technology is a technique that al-
lows multiple OS running concurrently on a host environment. It is also a resource
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abstraction component that ensures efficient and reliable usage of underlying physi-
cal resources, including computation and storage. This resource abstraction acts as
a security component by itself, using proper configuration and permissions. A cloud
provider would utilize hypervisors or containers (or both) for resource pooling. Do-
ing so provides and manages secure access to its physical computing resources, among
other advantages. The security aspect behind this subcomponent refers to access control
(ensuring authorized access to services, data, and other components) and usage mon-
itoring. The security topology should not expose user interface service functionality
to non-privileged users. Malware scanning should follow that access control, ensuring
comprehensive security monitoring of the whole environment.
• Host OS security: Operating System security commonly involves configuring the host
OS that supports the virtualization environment. As with all OS configurations, a fun-
damental approach is to reduce the attack surface to an acceptable level. For instance,
OS images used by a cloud provider can introduce risks to the cloud client when using
pre-owned virtual machines. The main threat arises in uploading images with built-in
Trojans. Thus, the authentication level to minimize the risk will depend on the overall
risk strategy and threat surface model.
2.5.2 Data Service Security
Data service security includes data protection and monitoring in the three stages of the data-
security lifecycle, namely data-at-rest, data-in-motion, and data-in-use, as follows:
• Data storage (data-at-rest) security: Data storage’s primary capabilities include man-
aging the storage required by BigCloud frameworks. However, modern cloud storage
components can provide backups services (including virtual storage). These backups
may consider a remediation technique that promotes the utilization of cloud capacities
as a storage service. Another remediation technique that the storage component can
collaborate with the hypervisor or container is to allow for workload migration and
storing metadata among host compute nodes. Data storage security services must cover
file systems, databases, and object storage security scanning (data content discovery) to
identify and locate sensitive content (e.g., credit card numbers). This method supports
data compliance and auditing efforts by providing comprehensive reporting on the ef-
fectiveness of data storage protection mechanisms. It also guides decisions on security
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measurements for implementing data encryption (disk-level encryption) and masking,
removing, or warning the file owner. To avoid this data locality problem and address
the fault tolerance issues, Hadoop put forth an efficient data replication scheme in the
HDFS [98]. Therefore, keeping up a similar replication instrument for each information
record prompts using them in terms of recovery or comparing records for any breach.
In general, data-at-rest is considered more vulnerable than data-in-transit [53]. How-
ever, Hadoop standard configuration does not provide encryption functionalities at their
Distributed File System (HDFS), which leads to the generation of Hadoop security-
complementing ecosystems.
• Data transfer (movement) security: Data transfer can be classified, based on the connec-
tion domain zone, into internal and external data movement. First, internal data transfer
occurs between storage capacities and processing units. This communication usually
takes place at the platform layer. The BigCloud should consider the internal network
as an untrusted network alongside the Internet. Hence, all data transfers (including the
meta-data) should be handled with the same level of minimal trust. However, ensuring
a high-level of security requires: a) encapsulating the data workloads; b) sniffing the
traffic on the network using proxies (to identify the content); and c) monitoring, re-
porting, and blocking abnormal bandwidth usage (using central policies) based on the
traffic type.
Second, the external data transfer occurs between the client and the BigCloud provider.
Here, the network acts as an intermediary that provides data transport using differ-
ent communication methods, from dedicated network channels to the open Internet.
Using the Internet is still the dominant pattern as it cuts costs. In this case, it is the
client’s responsibility to recognize the full set of security measurements to secure the
data migrated to the cloud, as data can be intercepted in transit. On the other hand,
the cloud may require the network provider to provide secure connections between
it and its clients to reduce vulnerabilities (e.g., man-in-the-middle attack) in Internet
transmission channels to a minimum. The network service provider should maintain
security control points, maintain security testing, and prevent suspected tasks.
• Data processing security: This refers to securing the processing environment. High-
reliability data execution may be achieved by: a) harnessing robust distributed file sys-
tems permissions, and b) enforcing isolation among computing instances, workloads,
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Table 2.2: Comparison of key security mechanisms of data stages
Data Security Access Data Data Physical Erasure Encryption Firewall and
Lifecycle Control Integrity Destruction Protection Coding Antimalware
Data storage
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Data transfer
√ √ √ √
Data process
√ √ √ √
and applications. Therefore, it is ideal to protect platform/application configuration
file(s) with appropriate access control. Doing so will prevent the attacker from modify-
ing these critical settings. According to a classification of malware attacks in IaaS exe-
cution environments [96], 71% of these attacks target the hypervisor denial-of-service.
In contrast, fault tolerance is the most important aspect when discussing data process-
ing security. To support high reliability and availability of BD operations, data blocks
used to be duplicated across multiple nodes. This traditional approach was costly and
returned with a moderate performance in massive operation scales [118], which lead to
the advancement of modern large-scale distribution storage systems with erasure cod-
ing techniques. This storage technique provides the same level of fault tolerance with
much less storage space and has been implemented with the HDFS [15]. Also, provid-
ing cell-level encryption for HBase on runtime was reported in [25].
2.5.3 Security Processes
Security mechanisms
Table 2.2 maps the data life-cycle stages to the primary implemented security mechanisms.
The table illustrates that data-at-rest is considered the most vulnerable, so it requires a larger
number of security mechanisms. Both data-replication and erasure-coding techniques con-
sider fault tolerance utilities while an encryption and protection of the integrity of data in the
transition stage is expected. The use of an adequate data sensitization technique to deliber-
ately, permanently, and irreversibly remove or delete data after ending the service contract
must be set at the service-level agreement. Preserving composable security for high-level ab-
stractions of data analytics and mining is also of security interest. On the other hand, secure
computations in distributed data-processing frameworks that are deployed over decentralized
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clouds (e.g., edge and fog clouds) should be considered within the security design. In the
meantime, these architectures demand real-time security and compliance monitoring.
As mentioned earlier, Hadoop standard security configurations may lead to several vul-
nerabilities. This issue can be tackled by utilizing the latest Hadoop 3.0 secure model, which
consists of a service level of authentication and authorization [16]. The security issues of BD
authentication are extensively discussed in [2]. Traditional data encryption may be employed
at different layers according to Hadoop 3.0 [17] namely, application-level, database-level,
filesystem-level, and disk-level encryption, in which HDFS-level encryption is placed be-
tween the database and file-system-level encryption. Accordingly, HDFS continues to provide
reliable performance, while BD frameworks run safely over encrypted data. This encryption
level limits the runtime level attacks as the OS interacts with encrypted data blocks.
Other BD-specific tools and techniques to improve the security ecosystem may include,
but are not limited to the following :
• Apache Knox gateway [18] over HTTP/HTTPs, which provides perimeter security with
REST API authentication and control access gateway utility for Hadoop clusters and
ecosystems. Apache Knox may also provide end-to-end wire encryption using a key-
store to hold the SSL certificate;
• Apache Ranger [19], a security orchestration framework with centralized administra-
tion and User Interface (UI) to enable, monitor, and manage data security across the
Hadoop Yarn clusters;
• Apache Sentry [20], which provides the ability to establish fine-grained (role-based
privileges) authorization on both users’ and applications’ data and metadata within
Hadoop clusters.
Security design and architecture
It is essential to address the BigCloud-specific security demands to completely illustrate the
various security components in a conceptual context. These demands may be summarized as
follows:
• Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation;
• Data recovery capability;
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• Maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of audit logs;
• Automation data protection.
After identifying the security components and functional requirements for the adoption
of BD in the Cloud, it is of research interest to highlight security design guidelines when
prototyping a BigCloud system:
• Component-based architecture: Quickly add new behaviours.
• Highly available: Scale to very serious workloads.
• Fault tolerant: Isolated processes avoid cascading failures.
• Recoverable: Failures should be easy to diagnose, debug, and rectify.
• Broad network access.
• Decreased visibility and control by the client.
• Dynamic system boundaries and commingled roles/ responsibilities between client and
provider.
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are exploitable system bugs, and they can be exposed remotely across all
cloud-service delivery layers. Attackers mainly target the vulnerabilities within the operat-
ing system (system kernel, libraries, and application tools). Hence, all services, components,
and data face significant risk. Plenty of remediation mechanisms, spanning from planning a
secure design to performing compliance testing to validate the security measurements, may be
implemented. Moreover, modeling risk patterns and vulnerability scanning, followed up by
installing security patches, can mitigate security gaps, as appropriate risk patterns can capture
most vulnerabilities [91]. According to [120], over public clouds, Hadoop suffers from an




Table 2.3: Pattern relation BCSAP to the Cloud pattern from [24].
Direction BigCloud to Cloud Pattern
Relation Type Refines
Reasoning The services deployed in a BigCloud can be created or com-
posed based on cloud patterns. Thus, the information in the
cloud can be translated as refinements descriptions of the ser-
vice in our BCSAP model. Specific technologies that form the
core of the BigCloud resources pool (e.g., storage) are mainly
based and rely on the cloud-architecture. Moreover, the cloud
architecture is essential for the mapping of BigCloud security
specification design.
2.6 Structured selection of BigCloud Security services
Security election is a control element that shapes policies, practices, procedures, and respon-
sibilities of IaaS cloud provider.
2.6.1 BigCloud Security Analysis Pattern
Figure 2.5 presents the elements and concepts of a secure BigCloud model and the relations
among these components. We propose the BCSAP patterns for a structured domain knowl-
edge election using the context-election pattern proposed in the cloud system analysis pat-
tern [24]. Furthermore, the relations between existing context patterns and the BCSAP are
defined in Table 2.3. The BCSAP shows a meta-model that forms a uniform basis for the
current and future BigCloud security deployment. The generalization of its elements creates
the basis of a pattern language that ships other deployment architectures (e.g., fog and mobile
edge-cloud security).
2.6.2 BigCloud Security Requirements Election
Hosting data off-premises increases the number of potential security risks. By considering the
security as mentioned in the BCSC, we divided the security issues, requirements, and charac-
teristics of BigCloud secure deployment. The following sections give details. Figure 2.6 is a
model designed to guide policies for information security life cycle within BigCloud systems.
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Security initialization
This policy establishes the level of security design by describing security requirements through
analyzing the security goals and use cases. This process is implemented using a service-level
agreement (SLA) with an IaaS client.
Gateway
In a cloud deployment architecture, where a multi-tenant environment is the dominant model,
it is critical to control the client’s access to the internal cloud entities (resources and services)
by defining which users and groups have access to a specific entity. In the case of BigCloud,
these entities are represented in the direct environment. A cloud gateway in this context is a
single sign-on layer that links the client requests, to the authorized entity of a cloud SW stack
securely and efficiently. This layer verifies the external client’s access to the system using
their user ID and passwords. Every client username and IP address has to be in the client’s
host file (/etc/hosts) or DNS table, and it has to match the client’s given password that can use
to map a connection between an IP address and domain names. Hence, it assists in addressing
network nodes in a computer network. This process may also include Apache Knox, a uni-
fied gateway framework for Hadoop services and ecosystems that can be utilized as an SSO
gateway. When connecting to a BigCloud cluster, there are several methods of authenticating
the access. For instance, using a simple username/password identification approach. Another
method is an authentication using Kerberos protocol (authentication based on tokens). Each
client and service must be authenticated by using the Kerberos keytab file (binary containing
the information needed to log) to initialize trust between a client/application and the BigCloud
components. Authentication for access to the Hadoop services web console requires enabling
HTTP SPNEGO protocol as a backend for Kerberos credentials. Thus, the two approaches
prevent unauthorized access to the stored data.
Access Control
In a BigCloud-based Business Intelligence environment, several user roles need to be en-
forced at the service level. These roles must be provisioned dynamically to ensure large-scale
participation while maintaining access control. This process improves security controls for
authentication and authorization and enforces access discussions to meet BigCloud regulatory
compliance. For instance, after users log-on to the cluster, the system must assign authoriza-
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tions (i.e., access rights over a given service). The system manages access in the context of a
specific service, resource, and data functionality provided by the cloud service provider. Big-
Cloud should support a robust set of role-level security that can be utilized to configure the
right level of application authorization for different user types, such as defining the users and
groups who are authorized to make service calls to cloud storage service. The call will pass
the authorization check only if the user making call belongs to an authorized service entity.
In general, the BigCloud platform security model supports three levels of permissions within
IaaS:
• Application level: Controls which users and groups are able to create, modify, and pub-
lish data within a BD application run within a specific execution engine (e.g., Hadoop).
A client can submit jobs and query results of a predefined framework with limited ac-
cess to the data.
• Framework level: Controls which users and groups are able to deploy, configure, and
administrate a BD framework (e.g., MapReduce, Spark, Storm) over the given cloud
instances. A client may access the runtime variables, paths, add/remove processing
features, and change the scheduler (e.g., fair or capacity) and the resource manager
(Hadoop Yarn, Apache Mesos, etc.).
• Runtime environment level: Controls which users and groups are able to query and
manage the runtime environment (VM, containers, OS, etc.). However, the client does
not control the underlying infrastructure but has limited control (based on the SLA
policy) to select networking components (e.g., virtual networks) and to select the OS
and VM capacities and configurations.
Data Governance
BD sources and types can vary in their nature with multiple data processing patterns generally
formulated as trees, graphs, or workflows. BigCloud should enable a client to maintain high
data quality throughout the complete lifecycle of the data, with flexible mechanisms that store
and access such data sources independently from their specific format. Moreover, metadata
formalisms should be defined and used to describe the relevant information associated with
data sources (e.g., location, type, format), enabling their access, use, and administration. A
common platform is also essential for metadata exchange and storage within the different
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elements. This design will assist in supporting policies consistently across the BigCloud
components. Apache Atlas provides data governance capabilities for the Hadoop stack and
helps in searching, classifying, and managing data [95].
Data Integrity
Storing clients’ critical data over a cloud model requires robust data integrity and availability
mechanisms. Cloud clients want to ensure that BigCloud provides appropriate data privacy
and integrity between all components of the system, as well as the data source with which they
communicate. Supporting the appropriate security for these connections is imperative by en-
suring adequate consistency and accuracy of data-in-transit. A block of data fetched from the
storage file system or database (e.g., an HDFS DataNode) could arrive corrupted due to faults
in the storage device, network faults, or buggy software, as well as abuse or attack. Several
approaches are implemented to tackle this issue, such as checksum checking on the transit
data or wire encryption. Wire-security, for data transfer between web console and client, may
be managed via Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL), cryptographic protocols HTTP communications. The cloud provider can configure
BigCloud Business Intelligence so that all communication between every component of the
cloud system, as well as with the web-client traffic, is secured using TLS/SSL. In Hadoop en-
vironment, clients are protected by using SSL(HTTPS). SSL configuration is recommended
but not required to configure Hadoop security with Kerberos for data encryption on HTTP.
Another implementation of end-to-end encryption relies on providing secure communi-
cation over public networks. In this case, all REST APIs offered by BigCloud components
(like Apache HBase, Hive [57], and Oozie [59]) are enforced to pass cryptographic protocols.
Doing so requires creating a key store to hold the TLS/SSL certificate and set up environment
variables. It takes two stages to set up a secure connection. The first one uses digital signatures
and asymmetric cryptography for authentication, while the second stage is for data transmis-
sion. Figure 2.7 summarize client connection to BigCloud services using a public network.
After a secure session is established (steps one and two), both the client (e.g., result query)
and BD frameworks (e.g., HBase data fetching) may access the data securely. The same ap-
proach applies to authenticate the internal components of communication upon an SLA policy.
For instance, SSL certification to secure connection between the access control and the data
storage requires either a self-signed or an authority-signed certificate. Thus, admins need to
configure SSL on REST server and a universal key-store to hold the SSL certificates.
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Figure 2.7: Implementing data encryption discussion over BigCloud components.
Data Confidentiality
This requirement assures that a given stored data cannot be reached by any client/application
except those who hold permission. Thus, data confidentiality in general aims at prevent-
ing protected data from being inappropriately accessed. It preserves authorized restrictions
on data access, including job metadata. Cryptographic encapsulation enforcement by using
distributed cryptographic protocols, such as PKI and identity/attribute-based encryption, is a
common trend. This security layer also includes validity and recoverability approaches as
Hadoop 3x starts utilizing erasure coding for fault tolerance. However, aiming for data confi-
dentiality, Hadoop’s HDFS implement end-to-end encryption with the so-called Transparent
Data Encryption (TDE) [92]. These HDFS encryption sets are at the file-level of on-disk data
and are stored as NameNode metadata. Further, HDFS TDE operations rely on encryption
zone level of all components of a path, which means all files designated zones are encrypted
on disk. In context, transparent “at-rest” encryption implies that the client/application access
data without being aware the data was encrypted. It also indicates that data is automatically
encrypted and decrypted on-the-fly as it is read or written. However, it is not meant to hide
sensitive data (e.g., data masking technique). Nevertheless, security policies like masking can
be implemented on top of TDE data as a post-decryption.
Figure 2.8 shows the confidentiality layer components, stages, and granularity levels
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Figure 2.8: Transparent Data Encryption Analysis Pattern with Encryption Zones Granularity
in a BigCloud System Architecture.
within a BigCloud ecosystem. Ensuring adequate services and data confidentiality while the
client is signed into a privileged BigCloud session requires several layers of control. These
layers for controlling data confidentiality are separated across four essential strategies. Fig-
ure 2.9 discusses these strategies by grouping similar techniques and mechanisms into the
same layer of granularity. The figure further specifies both the solution domain (threat cate-
gory) and the solution limitation over a BigCloud security stack.
On the other hand, TDE encrypts HDFS data at rest (on disk) using an interaction of
multiple components and security keys. Next, we illustrate these components and stages by
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Figure 2.9: Transparent Data Encryption Analysis Pattern with Encryption Zones Granularity
in the BigCloud System Architecture.
defining these components and encryption steps:
• Enforcer UI is a panelboard that is a subset of the general management panel to provide
connectivity among the security services and customers. It also acts as a registration
authority for all of the external logins and all REST APIs. As a first confidentiality stage
for verifying client’s calls, it employs either simple username/passwords or a third-
party protocol such as Kerberos authentication. Additionally, system admins manage
the process (create, edit, and delete policies) for the clients, groups, and applications
that can use the service through the UI tool.
• Central Access Authority (CAA) is a policy-based authority that keeps issuing the en-
cryption service that controls the client access for BigCloud customers. However, it
represents the primary stage of the data confidentiality process that releases access
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policies and functionalities by matching each user/group with its granted permission
key and enforcing encryption discussions.
• Key Management Service (or Server) (KMS) is a validation entity that approves client/
application reading and writing permissions to the service (encrypted zone). Upon
passing the KMS, it affords the master key to encrypt or decrypt the data. In this context,
all of the policy creation, encryption, and decryption processes of data encryption key
zones are managed in the KMS layer. Apache Ranger may be utilized as a third-party
KMS.
• Encrypted Zone (EZ) is a unique file path (a directory or a database) the contents of
which are transparently encrypted. When establishing a new encryption zone, a single
encryption key is associated with each of these zones. Moreover, the content files within
these zones hold a private data encryption key. These keys are never handled directly by
the CAA, as they only see a stream of encrypted chunks. This process can be managed
as follow:
1. Create Key: After creating the targeted EZ, the admin creates a key for each
particular zone (EZK).
2. Create Policy: The admin launch policy against each EZK, which spawns ser-
vice inclusion (who can read/write to the EZ) and add clients/applications to that
policy.
• Encryption Layer: The client/application informs the CAA it wants to write a file (e.g.,
SQL client accessing Hive) to a particular EZ. The CAA requests the KMS to return an
encrypted data encryption key from the key store by establishing a trusted connection
between the server and the key management server. The client may use that key to
write/encrypt to the EZ and read/decrypt from the file. The CAA stores the encrypted
data encryption key in the metadata store.
It worth mentioning that the CAA does not control the data encryption keys (encrypted
data in the files) directly, but it uses an encrypted data encryption key that can only be de-
crypted by the clients’ data encryption system.
Confidentiality must be maintained throughout the complete data lifecycle. However,
herein we highlight the BigCloud confidentiality challenges in terms of data halt, where con-
fidentiality is delivered typically via data encryption techniques. Figure 2.9 shows a com-
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parison of data confidentiality granularity with related approaches to data security within the
BigCloud system. Medium-grained encryption (MGE) enforces the decision of which files
and directories to encrypt on clients’ behalf (i.e., clients’ discretion)—thereby protecting the
swap space, OS, containers, and temporary files as well. MGE, however, does not replace
the fine-grained encryption (FGE) in all scenarios. The VM encryption may be employed in
conjunction with the file-based encryption, seeking secure multi-layer encryption implemen-
tation.
On the other hand, FGE management operates over individual files, directories, and tables
(i.e., accessible HBase/Hive DB table columns, Kafka queues, and HDFS file-level of access).
With the ability to encrypt each of its components with a separate encryption key, the FGE
provides flexible policy decisions and high-performance encryption. Therefore, FGE provides
greater overall protection as it stays encrypted through the rest of the layers. However, this
protection is at the cost of increased complexity (i.e., it is more comfortable to encrypt a hard
drive than a specific cell for instance). FGE has to be associated with a robust access control
mechanism and enabled wire encryption.
HDFS is a Java-based framework that requires a JVM environment and contact with the
Linux kernel file system before reaching the stored data in the disks. Hence, the machine ker-
nel security (of OS-level) is concerned with security design when processing sensitive data
over a public cloud. Utilizing HDFS TDE could potentially cause a slight performance degen-
eration as additional process layers are attached. However, doing so is justified and acceptable
compared to potential threats. Alternatively, direct access to the multi-tenant database may be
restricted to specific admins (e.g., DBA). The client’s service calls may be routed through an
intermediate business layer, which enforces security checks, including means for protecting
personal identity and proprietary information. Moreover, visibility labels may be utilized by
tagging cells in a table (e.g., Apache HBase) and controlling access to them. This method
restricts the access to specific subsets of labeled data in a fine-grained manner.
In Figure 2.9, the coarse-grained encryption is the easiest to implement and manage, and
it is the most flexible security approach. This layer limits the system access (e.g., cluster) in
a single access point, such as an SSO using username/password authentication or Kerberos
protocol. In contrast, the medium-grained encryption works on the runtime environment (i.e.,
VM access control and encryption). This reasonable compromise shifts the complexity of a
solution to the required level of isolation, especially when implemented with other confiden-
tiality layers. The next two layers (fine-grained) are the most secure yet complex approaches
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to acquire; they require very detailed policy definitions, including the DB , data node, and
even control decisions on the file paths and the specific rows, columns, and cells of the target
storage.
Auditing and Analysis
To cope with the modern security demands of large-scale distributed clusters, as in a Big-
Cloud, any security architecture should be able to perform security auditing and analysis at
the service level. Security auditing and analysis aggregates log files and reports and provides
a robust audit capability within different components of the BD ecosystem. This layer may
also afford granular insights into pieces of information by performing security and risk as-
sessments, tracking data pipeline audit logs, and examining behavioral analytics to meet their
compliance demands within BigCloud. Examples of this may include incident reporting, be-
havioral and data activities analytics, daemon (processes starting under the framework and
running in the background) logs, and risk assessment of the system components regularly.
This feature does not only identifying security issues but provides a sophisticated alert engine
that identifies security vulnerabilities and shows insights. Apache Eagle is an open source
analytics solution for the Hadoop frameworks and applications [14].
Orchestration and Automation
With the increasing number of different security frameworks, policies, and products in a cloud
stack, the connection and integration of these tools is a cornerstone behind inclusive security.
This process is called security orchestration, and it brings together these various technologies
to work in harmony for the benefit of its customers. It is crucial to standardize and model
security to enable interoperability among the various security subcomponents and products.
This effort aids in supporting the heterogeneity of security deployment over IaaS using various
security layers and tools. By bringing together security components consistency it improves
efficiency and effectiveness of security management and the processes surrounding them. Or-
chestration, hence, is critical for managing the heterogeneity of security deployment over IaaS
using various security layers and tools. By bringing together security components consistency,
the orchestration process improves the efficiency and effectiveness of security management
and the processes surrounding them. Moreover, the synchronization of the security ecosystem
helps security admins and clients to make more informed decisions and aids in better spec-
ification development. Security orchestration involves advanced automation procedures by
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assembling security alerts across the ecosystem. By enabling universal alert repository, se-
curity implementers may execute automatable mitigation policies and standardized reactions
scenarios. This feature strengthens the overall security operations and supports the right in-
cident response. Apache Knox provides a common platform for frameworks interaction by
abstracting the policy exchange. Likewise, Apache Bigtop [13] equips the stack with compre-
hensive packaging, testing, and configuration of big data frameworks. Bigtop supports a wide
range of components/tools for continuous integration using a Jenkins server.
2.7 Summary and open challenges
In this chapter of the thesis, we propose a systematic research methodology for the security
of BigCloud adoption. By capturing the methodology stages, we design four primary models
that guide the security deployment of any BigCloud solution. First, we design a reference
architecture to summarize the relationship between the security service and other cloud ser-
vices as well as their functions. Second, we offer a solution to the main research question,
which deals with the security elements associated with a BD deployment over the IaaS cloud
model. Our solution is the design of a security component model that consists of main ac-
tors that emphasize the separation of concerns with respect to the service functionality (data
service security, IaaS security, etc.) and non-functional security requirements at the begin-
ning of the design, through a reuse-based approach and specifications. Third, we propose a
security analysis pattern that refines the cloud context-pattern [24] in synergy to an extended
CIA triad [68]. It provides a set of guidelines for the structuring of BD specifications, which
relates a cloud design to its security environment. Finally, we suggest a structured election
method for BigCloud-specific security selection. It delivers various insights regarding the lat-
est ongoing developments and cutting-edge frameworks by mapping each security domain to
its solution knowledge.
2.7.1 Recommendations
Although this chapter has offered an acceptable start towards BigCloud security evaluation
and has enhanced the overall understanding of the BigCloud security process. Aiming to
analyze further and discuss our results, we draft some recommendations and suggestions that
converge on the idea of BigCloud security by design for both service providers and clients
from the knowledge obtained in this study.
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BigCloud Provider
Several strategic recommendations maybe suggested and given to the service providers to
improve and fill the unimproved gaps. Among these recommendations is BigCloud Security
Evaluation Framework. The main goal of this evaluation framework is to help BigCloud
providers to identify the unimproved gaps according to particular security control elements.
An example of such effort is represented in section 4.
Deploying BD frameworks in a cloud environment, whether private or public, demands
proactive thinking regarding security ramifications. Security is magnified when consider-
ing the impact on clients’ sensitive data. This is especially true when IaaS cloud providers
control the underlying infrastructure (storage, servers, and networks), while clients have no
control over these assets. This shift of responsibility requires providing capabilities to assure
the functional properties of BigCloud security and the trust concerns between the BD owner
and the IaaS cloud providers. These concerns are based on a lack of control, visibility, and
governance while outsourcing the client’s data computation. Ensuring the security of BD
frameworks over cloud deployment architectures is a keystone to sustain the porting of BD
applications to cloud deployment architectures.
A substantial effort has been made to solve the problem of cloud quality-of-service evalu-
ation [6]. Data security and reliability are first-class considerations that play an essential role
in most cloud-computing contexts. However, there is a remarkable research gap regarding the
evaluation of the BD security service within the cloud [48]. A security evaluation framework
can maximize the level of trust (between resource provider and user) and minimize the risk
to an acceptable level. Hence, BD application implementers not only have a clear sense of
whether the provided service security level is high or low, but can also assist in improving the
trust level among them. In this regard, a security evaluation framework that identifies unim-
proved gaps (according to security control elements) serves to converge BD operations to vast
cloud environments. Clients will consider an IaaS cloud provider trustworthy if they fulfill
the security requirements of a rigorous security evaluation framework.
It is still challenging to put forward such an improvement plan unless it is based on the
results of a security analysis that establishes clear security components and requirements. The
BCSC model accommodates the previous security evaluation framework requirements. Cloud
adopters, who are involved in the development of BD solutions, may leverage the BCSC to
perform a security analysis that maps the installed/needed security components. Further, the
BCSC guides the security designers in selecting the required security controls that best suit
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their demands. Overall, an evaluation framework with interest in BigCloud security would
help in the following:
• Meeting client satisfaction: BigCloud service providers can provide adequate informa-
tion regarding their system security, which indeed raises client satisfaction.
• Improving BigCloud security services: Security evaluation can play a vital role in meet-
ing client demands by providing the IaaS cloud with security improvement initiatives
and gap analysis.
• Managing security risk: Security evaluation results can guide providers in detecting
unimproved security gaps between their current IaaS cloud state and the ideal security
state.
• Guide porting new BD execution environments: A secure BD execution environment
would serve to converge BD operations with the vast cloud paradigms (e.g., edge cloud,
decentralized cloud, etc.).
• Gaining competitive advantages: IaaS cloud providers could use the results of the se-
curity evaluation framework to remain competitive in the market.
BigCloud Client
Several recommendations can be concluded for BigCloud clients. For instance, clients are
recommended to use password managers, which offer greater security and convenience for
the use of passwords to access BigCloud services. Typically, clients’ passwords are managed
using an encryption mechanism, which is achieved principally through storing such passwords
in an encrypted database. The clients have to ensure that the cloud providers protects their
identity correctly and that they enforce strong and unique passwords. Other features used
for automating the filling of the password and sharing credentials, which are integrated to
the function of the browser over services (e.g., XML or REST) and allow users to change
and randomize passwords, are required to be testified by the client for better cloud service
selection. For instance, Azure Active Directory (AD) uses REST instead of the traditional
LDAP, which is meant for running applications over SaaS and providing identity management
services. Meanwhile, AWS provides fine-grained access control to AWS resources.
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COMMON SECURITY CRITERIA FOR
VEHICULAR CLOUDS
Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming increasingly crucial to intelligent transportation sys-
tem stakeholders, including cloud-based vehicular cloud (VC) and Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
paradigms. This new trend involves communication and data exchange between several ob-
jects within different layers of control. Security in such a deployment is pivotal to realize
the general IoT-based smart city. However, the evaluation of the degree of security regarding
these paradigms remains a challenge. This chapter provides an insight into addressing this
concern.
3.1 Introduction
Cloud Computing offers virtualized technology and networking resources over the Internet to
store, process, and analyze petabytes of organizations and individual data dynamically [54].
Over the last years, advancements in this trending technology have shaped the modern ap-
plication delivery model and the functions they perform [113, 116, 27]. IoT continues to be
one of the fastest growing computing models. According to [58], the estimated IoT security
market of this model will reach 4.4 Billion USD by 2022.
With its great potential to provide cheap and straightforward access to large amounts of
scalable computing power, the advantages of adopting cloud computing to IoT applications
are indisputable [1]. The vehicular cloud offers to combine the best of both vehicular ad
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hoc networks (VANETs) and cloud computing. Therefore, by utilizing cloud capabilities to
extend the inter-networked vehicles, clients can enjoy efficient services (e.g., entertainment)
as well as receive real-time alerts about road incidents or traffic status. However, when a VC
system is realized, important security factors should be considered. These factors include the
architectural design of the system and the utilization of underlying security technologies and
services.
A main issue is related to client trust in data transfer in and out of VANETs. This connec-
tivity concern mainly involves communication among vehicles (V2V), vehicle to infrastruc-
ture (V2I), and vehicle to cloud (V2C) connection, besides storing and processing critical data
within an off-premise (public) datacenter. Other security threats associated with this adoption
include privacy, integrity, confidentiality, and the availability of data in its whole life cycle.
Fulfilling the highest security and data protection requirements, among all architecture deliv-
ery layers, is a common objective. Nevertheless, various effects can make it challenging to
ensure the security properties of intelligent transportation systems [60]. For this reason, secu-
rity and privacy of data management are considered among the leading next-decade research
directions in the VC field [28, 38].
This work contributes to the VC security deployment body of knowledge by facilitating
the realization of secure Internet of Vehicles systems in the VC model by identifying the com-
mon security criteria (CSC). First, we start examining in detail the building blocks of the VC
security stack for supporting IoV science. Then, we classify the different layers of security
based on their supported service models into a conceptual model. Second, we provide many
insights into VC privacy by introducing a novel security analysis pattern. This pattern maps
the current VC architecture layers into privacy granularity specifications of the solution do-
main. Finally, we propose a security evaluation conceptual model that consists of six criteria
that influences VC security formation. The model methodology consists of security control el-
ements (SCEs) that generally influence both the client and provider security formation within
the VC environment. Next, we extend these SCEs by identifying the most relevant security
control components (SCCs) and security control subcomponents (SCSs) that aimed to develop
an effective VC trust solution.
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Figure 3.1: A conceptual layered abstraction architecture for connected vehicles model.
3.2 Vehicular Clouds Security
Cloud computing is a set of enabling technologies, broader services, and more flexible so-
lutions for an enterprise to deploy its frameworks. This section discusses the relationship
between IoV and cloud-computing services. Further, we specify a vocabulary to design el-
ements associated with VC actors by presenting a VC conceptual model, which outlines the
main components of the VC environment. It abstracts the relationship between the security
service and other VC services as well as their functions. It, therefore, relates to companion
security requirements and features that are the basis for conducting reliable VC implementa-
tion.
Overall, Figure 3.1 illustrates the major actors within the VC ecosystem to refer as: objects
and communication layer, Edge/Fog IT support service layer, Cloud service delivery layer,
and finally, applications and business intelligent layer. In such architecture, the data life cycle
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is composed of several stages, with the data flowing from sensors and smart objects to the
cloud. It begins with data generation (e.g., collected from vehicles and IoV infrastructure) by
different objects, where connection security is required. The allocated data are then assembled
(using compression and aggregation) and transferred to Edge IT and the cloud. Following this,
metadata are reserved, and the data are materialized in the cloud storage within a data lake,
which can be a multi-tenant storage serving several applications.
In the same context, data life cycle flows among different VC service layers. First, from
the data generation point (very bottom) is the sensor mesh network, named object and com-
munication abstraction, which comprises physical smart devices such as sensors. This layer
outlines hardware and firmware that provide car–to–car and car–to–infrastructure (defined
earlier as V2V and V2I) connectivity using different communication technologies like Blue-
tooth or Wi-Fi. Subsequently, with the vast number of IoV devices spawning, the storage
and computation of this data will take place on the cloud. Hence, different applications can
harness it to make valuable decisions. It is worth mentioning that some applications utilize
stream data processing on the edge nodes (also including Fog deployments) such as traffic
ahead or parking nearby. This will be further discussed in Section 3. Finally, VC systems
grant end users with applications in a SaaS layer (e.g., machine learning and ITS). These
applications, however, leverage the services and functionalities of the lower cloud services
layer. Based on an analysis of these applications, users and administrators can remotely send
commands to smart devices at the bottom layer. Supporting architecture security involves
several approaches, spanning from physical and network security to edge and cloud platform
security. It also includes the framework and application security, security analytics (e.g., be-
havioral analysis, data flow analysis, Trojan detection, etc.) and continues security testing,
besides identification and access management, such as authentication and authorization.
3.2.1 Cloud Data Security
Cloud Data operations include data protection and monitoring in the three stages of the data-
security life cycle: data at rest, data in motion, and data in use [32, 72, 53]. Table 2.2 maps
each stage with its primary security mechanism. These stages are further discussed as follows:
Data storage (data-at-rest) security: The primary capabilities of data storage include
managing the storage required by VC applications. However, modern cloud storage compo-
nents can implement backups (including virtual storage). These backups may be considered
a remediation technique that encourages working with the backup to create snapshots at reg-
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ular intervals. Another way that the storage component can collaborate with the hypervisor
or container is to allow for workload migration and metadata storage among the datacenter
nodes. Data storage security services must cover file systems (FS), database (DB), and object
storage (OSt) sytems security scanning (data content discovery) to identify and locate sen-
sitive content (e.g., credit card numbers). This method supports data compliance and audit
efforts by conducting comprehensive reporting on the effectiveness of data storage protection
mechanisms and guides decisions on security measurements for implementing data encryp-
tion (disk-level encryption) and masking, removing, or warning the file owner. In general,
data at rest is considered more vulnerable than data in transit [53].
Data transfer (data-in-motion) security: It can be classified, based on the connection
domain zone, into cloud and edge data movement. The first one involves internal data transfer
between storage capacities and processing units on the cloud. This communication usually
takes place at the platform layer. Businesses must accept the reality of data insecurity in-
motion and take proactive steps to remediate the security risk that’s inherent with sending
data off-premise. All data transfers (including the metadata) should be handled with the same
level of minimal trust. Measurements to prevent an expensive and embarrassing data breach
include:
• Private WAN service or encapsulating the data workloads;
• Implement robust network security controls and sniffing the traffic on the network using
proxies (to identify the content);
• IPsec VPN gateway and transport layer security protocols.
Second, external data transfer occurs between the vehicles and the cloud provider, causing
the network to act as an intermediary that provides data transport services using different
communication methods, from dedicated network channels to ad-hoc networks and the open
Internet. The cloud may require the network provider to provide secure connections between it
and the IoVs to keep vulnerabilities (e.g., a man-in-the-middle attack) in Internet transmission
channels to a minimum. The network service provider should maintain security control points,
conduct security testing, and prevent suspected tasks.
Data processing (data-in-use) security: This refers to securing the processing environ-
ment. High-reliability data execution may be achieved by (i) harnessing robust distributed
identification and access management and (ii) enforcing isolation among different IoV zones,
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edges, and applications. Appropriate access control is required for protecting IoV configu-
ration and its applications [51]. Doing so will prevent the attacker from modifying these
critical assets [11]. Data blocks are duplicated across multiple nodes to support high relia-
bility and availability of VC operations. This traditional approach is considered costly and
achieved moderate performance in large scales of operation [118], which makes the advance-
ment of modern large-scale distributed storage systems with erasure coding techniques neces-
sary. This storage technique provides the same level of fault tolerance with much less storage
space and has been already implemented successfully in the Hadoop Distributed File System.
3.3 Vehicular Clouds Security Analysis Pattern
Hosting data in IoT-based systems increases the number of potential security risks. In consid-
ering security, as mentioned earlier, we divided privacy within such a deployment into several
granularity levels. The following sections provide insights in this regard using a security anal-
ysis pattern. These analysis patterns capture an abstraction of the targeted security solution,
which is represented as a group of related, generic objects with stereotypical attributes and
expected interactions [91, 24].
Figure 3.2 shows a model designed to guide policies for the information security life
cycle within VC systems. The model is composed of two environments: indirect and direct.
On the one hand, the indirect system environment is related to the legislator, service provider,
external customers, and other stakeholders that interact indirectly with the VC; that is, they
are not connected to the IoV by association. Nevertheless, data, patterns, and model sharing
apply at this layer. The business domain, as an intermediate layer, acts as a bridge between
indirect and direct environments.
The direct environment, meanwhile, has been divided into five interacted layers, based on
the VC service layers in Figure 3.1. The object and communication abstraction have been di-
vided into the VANET and the backend communication channel. Meanwhile, application and
business intelligence have been divided into business services and business domain. Finally,
the support service layer is represented by edge IT services including the same functionality.
These service layers have been designed by refining the layered architecture for the IoT
in [97, 31] to meet the IoV specifications. Our model also refines the virtual object layer
that bridges the gap between the physical and the virtual world [88] by extending its security
functionalities. This layer separation aims at analyzing the security objects and attributes of
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Figure 3.2: Confidentiality control as a security analysis pattern in a vehicular cloud system
architecture.
the VC ecosystem with a higher granularity.
The data flow from the mesh network objects up to the client’s applications in the cloud.
The bottom layer comprises physical smart devices, which enables efficient information ex-
change by expressing communication as V2V, V2I, and V2C. Overall, data integrity and con-
fidentiality are the primary concern. In the upper layer, the back-end composite communica-
tion channel aggregates data to meet the IoV application requirements. These communica-
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tions can be implemented as web resources using RESTful Web Services or other protocols
such as MQTT. It thus provides universal methodologies that link all physical objects to the
edge IT. In this case, authentication policies (attribute based, time based, zone based, etc.)
as well as nonrepudiation mechanisms are substantial. RFID-based identification enables the
implementation of a wide range of applications by linking the physical objects and the virtual
world [88].
3.3.1 Fog and cloud computing
Fog computing extends the cloud computing paradigm to the edge of the network [26, 56].
This is critical in time and location-sensitive IoV applications, as modern ITS demands real-
time processing in many scenarios where VC resources are inter-networked via purely peer-
to-peer connections [46]. Therefore, the association of edge/fog computing and IoV stream
processing is imperative [26]. This trend aims at addressing the associated high latency, low
bandwidth, and communication delays pertinent to using the central cloud. Access control,
wire encryption (end-to-end), data governance, and co-existence of heterogeneous network
architecture over a shared infrastructure are the main barriers to improving trust.
With the broad participation of IoV and other ITS devices, the allocation and execution
of data will mainly be done in the cloud. In the final stage, different applications can harness
business intelligence to make valuable decisions. These applications leverage the services and
functionalities of the lower cloud services layer. Data integrity is considered under these cir-
cumstances, and software integrity should be considered, too. In general, software integrity is
divided into protecting virtual objects in the second and third layers (communication between
entities and edge/cloud resources by mean of RESTful APIs). Clients and administrators can
remotely forward commands and instructions to smart devices at the bottom layer using these
applications. They also can prepare reports, conduct in-depth analysis, or even utilize visual-
ization applications. The admins set ID access control and transparent data encryption at rest
(on disk) using the interaction of multiple components and security keys.
3.3.2 VC Confidentiality Service
The confidentiality layer components, stages, and granularity levels within a VC ecosystem
are shown in Figure 3.2. Ensuring adequate services and data confidentiality (over its com-
plete life cycle) while the client is signed into a privileged VC session is the main goal. These
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layers are distributed across five essential strategies for controlling data confidentiality with
different levels of control. Figure 2.8 illustrate these components and stages by defining the
components and encryption steps. However, the encryption engine is the foundation layer
in any security solution. Utilizing a hardware security module provides the highest level of
physical security. In this model, it is recommended to implement strong authentication and
cryptoprocessing at the IoV communication stage (backend communication or data aggrega-
tion stations). This mechanism provides the most secure option using a fine-grained approach
and acceleration of cryptographic processes to improve performance. This approach is well
recognized in large-scale systems such as ATM security [70] and vehicular hardware secu-
rity models [117]. It is also worth mentioning that wire encryption protocols may be utilized
(SSL/TLS based authentication).
Another technology for maintaining the confidentiality is the Blockchain. Blockchain as
an enabling technology of blocks cryptography, which has been established as a solution for
the large-scale distributed agents of the Bitcoin system security [64]. In its core functionality,
Blockchain technology relies on providing robust cryptographic proof for data authentication
and integrity — by providing a list of all transactions and a hash to the previous block. This
list is verified by a majority agreement of nodes which are actively involved in verifying and
validating transactions [39].
3.4 Security Control Elements
The majority of current VC systems are deficient in conducting trust analysis that aids in
improving the understandability, decomposability, and reliability of their systems. Therefore,
it is suggested to provide highly trustworthy evidence of the proposed evaluation criteria, with
a robust methodology that assists the exploration of the subjective nature of security evaluation
criteria within the targeted VC solution.
This research addresses the previous issue by capturing security services used in VC envi-
ronments to describe the security items and the relationships amongst them. It further exam-
ines security oriented to VC trustworthy design, aiming to represent its glossary and landscape
techniques and to define research gaps. Security election, in general, is a control element that
shapes the policies, practices, procedures, and responsibilities of the service provider.
The question we are addressing regarding the verity of security solutions in VC is as
follows: What are the Common Security Criteria (CSC) in context-based security that can be
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used to evaluate the degree of security in VC environment?
To answer the question, we collected all criteria of trust that have appeared in the literature-
based security. The most critical criteria are: (i) physical and environmental protection; (ii)
logical access control; (iii) data and service confidentiality; (iv) data and service integrity; (v)
data and service availability; and, finally, (vi) life cycle control (auditing, governance, and
compliance).
To facilitate using the systematic criteria selection methodology, we summarize the pro-
posed models using tables, which consist of SCEs that generally influence security. These
SCEs are designed to cope with the security services mentioned earlier in Section 3.2 (Fig-
ure 3.2). Namely, physical, network, edge IT, cloud, and application security, respectively.
We have further extended these SCEs from different research contexts into VC context by
identifying SCCs and security control subcomponents (SCS) with the aim of developing an
effective VC security solution.
Physical and environmental protection is a subcategory of security. This control area
involves the core facilities and equipment of VC (sensors, storages, and networks). As the
base for all the above layers, it is critical to ensure an adequate level of security design and
implementation. The analysis results, as shown in Table 3.1, showed that the physical and
environmental protection areas can be divided into hardware and software SCC.
Table 3.1: Identifying physical and environmental protection and its TCC of Security.
SCE Vehicular Cloud physical and environmental protection
SCC Type Refines both Hardware and Software Security
SCS and their
importance
- Smart objects, Sensors, and Actuators Security
- Communication channels security
- Network Security design (segmentation and isolation).
- Firmware Security.
To fortify infrastructure and resources (internal equipment
and devices like network devices) with roles and privileges
and prevent any unauthorized access. Additionally, to detect
any abnormal behavior while controlling Firmware accessi-
bility by entities to ensure business continuity.
Logical access control is a set of rules and procedures that control access to VCs content
and/or data. It can be sub-divided into authentication, authorization, and service gateway. The
analysis results, as shown in Table 3.2, point out that many authentication mechanisms may
be applied to increase the level of access security.
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Table 3.2: Identifying Logical Access Control and its SCC of Security.
SCE Vehicular Cloud logical Access Control




- LDAP-based and Kerberos protocol
- Third party approach.
- Dual-stage authentication (at mesh network and Edge lay-
ers).
Make sure that access to the VC is controlled with only the
commands necessary to perform authorized functions and in-
crease the level of access security. Furthermore, to manage
the IoV roles and privileges and prevent any unauthorized
functions.
Encryption as a security tool, fortifying data confidentiality by ensuring that an authorized
entity can only access a piece of the given information (data flow). Building trust in VC is
required by service providers to ensure some specific encryption control criteria. The analysis
results, as shown in Table 3.3, indicate that several encryption methods can be applied to
maintain the confidentiality.
Table 3.3: Identifying Confidentiality and its TCC of Security.
SCE Vehicular Cloud Confidentiality
SCC Type Refines Data Encryption control at rest.
SCS and their
importance
- Transparent Data Encryption
- Blockchain of Things
- End-to-end wire encryption
- Identity-based encryption and attribute-based encryption.
-Data masking and tokenization.
To ensure that data are encrypted at the whole life-cycle. Key
management, key distribution, and encryption engine are as-
sociated interests when implementing VC confidentiality.
The creation and location of virtual objects are primarily proposed in the VC, and their
communication uses RESTful technologies. Building trust in VC requires specific integrity
control areas and control criteria, especially when using Wi-Fi or public networks to reach
a cloud service, by applying validation or error checking. The analysis results, as shown in
Table 3.4, indicate that integrity can be divided into data at transition and software/hardware
integrity using different approaches to tackle this issue. Protecting edge IT by developing
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Table 3.4: Identifying Integrity and its TCC of Security.
SCE Vehicular Cloud Integrity




- Data transmission protection, e.g., SSL/TLS protocol.
- Data isolation. (encryption)
- Communication Integrity (objects and edge/cloud computa-
tion)
- Scalability and compatibility.
Integrity ensures that data and related HW/SW can only be
accessed and modified by those who authorized smart objects
and applications. Integrity includes controlling the physical
environment, that is, network and servers. Data integrity can
be indicated by any malicious action, while data is transmit-
ted (e.g., a man-in-the-middle attack) between the smart ob-
jects to the cloud or between the IoV components.
a method for granting its resource privileges to enforce information flow between V2I and
V2C requires trusted computing techniques such as the virtual trusted platform module as a
supplementary security measurement.
Table 3.5: Identified Availability and its TCC of Security.
SCE Vehicular Cloud Availability




- Failure history and recovery
- Redundancy of disasters and incidents
May also be referred to as resilience and fault tolerance,
which aims to guarantee that data/service remains available
at a required level of performance in the event of the failure
of some VC components.
Availability is a sub-category of trust. It is used to argue that VC can be made available to
end users (clients and vehicles) from anywhere at any time by using any gadget. Furthermore,
VC should ensure the availability of the operating time of the system as specified in the SLA.
The analysis results are shown in Table 3.5.
Finally, compliance is a sub-category of accountability. It refers to verifying the commit-
ment of VC providers to follow specific legal requirements, standards, contracts, and policies.
Additionally, auditing is a sub-category of analysis. Any secure model should not only secure
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Table 3.6: Identifying Life-cycle management and its TCC of Security.
SCE Vehicular Cloud Life-cycle management
SCC Type Refines Auditing, Governance, and compliance controls
SCS and their
importance
- Behavioral analytics and monitoring
- Managing service/operation log information and file
- Tagging (data labeling for governance) and filtering
- Automation of service.
- Compliance with legalisation (data and software).
- Compliance with SLA.
To make sure that all VC stages meets the auditing, gover-
nance, and compliance control requirements.
its entities but should be able to perform security auditing at the whole service layers (from
sensors to the cloud). Correspondingly, governance is a capability that ensures efficient man-
ageability and data/service quality. This feature leverages information to help implementers
gain insight and build confidence in business decisions and operations. The analysis results
are shown in Table 3.6.
3.5 Summary
The main objective of the study was to review and further discuss the various criteria that
influence degree of security in the VC context. This chapter first outlines a conceptual model
that provides an overview of the criteria that influences both the client and provider security
formation. Next, we create a security analysis pattern that envisions VC to have both back-
end data aggregation channels (e.g., MQTT broker) and edge/fog data services to supplement
the sensor mesh network (e.g., VANET) and cloud architecture layers. It also represents VC
privacy as a multi-criteria construct affecting the data life cycle.
This research realized that the majority of current VC systems fail to provide the security-
level for their system. We also advocate that, when evaluation and selection is realized, VCs
can lead to a significant enhancement in the system security that sustains its adoption by the
clients. Thus, we explore the various criteria that influence the security degree in the IoV-
cloud context. In the next chapter, we intend to extend the implementation of this model
to an evaluation framework of IoT-based VC environments using a fuzzy modified VIKOR







The vast amount of data generated by the Internet of Things (IoT), especially VANETs (vehic-
ular ad hoc networks), needs a scalable resource, which can be provided by cloud computing
on a rental basis. Accordingly, the cloud has attracted the most significant interest in IoT-
based applications [27, 69], particularly vehicular clouds (VCs) [94]. The transmitted data
in such a realm should be located securely throughout the whole life cycle to guarantee high
data privacy. Security is a crucial aspect of spreading the adoption of cloud capabilities among
industrial connected vehicles (CVs) [103] and industrial cyber-physical systems [109, 40]. In
this regard, security by design can mitigate many of these imposed challenges [84]. With-
out adequately addressing this concern, a VC would not gain the clients’ trustworthiness and,
hence, acceptance. This facility can be achieved by regularly evaluating the security compo-
nents of the VC to put together an adequate plan of improvement. However, a dedicated work
that evaluates the trustworthiness of this framework remains an open challenge.
When a cloud-based connected vehicle (CV) system is realized, significant security con-
cerns should be considered [85, 44, 115]. Security features (criteria) are not equal, which
means that they should not be governed and managed at the same level. It is essential to note
the importance of creating a shared understanding of security-related criteria and be able to
assign priorities based on each security criteria impact and potential for mitigation. These
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considerations include security by design of the system and utilization of underlying security
technologies and services. This research captures security services used in industrial CVs
that describe the VC security items and relationships among them. It also presents landscape
techniques to define security gaps (distance from an ideal point of security) and best practices.
This work aims at facilitating the realization of vehicles securely connected to cloud comput-
ing in an industrial environment. First, we analyze the security criteria of data analytics in
VC computing and propose three-level security evaluation elements. Namely, Level 1 con-
sists of 6 common security criteria (CSCs). Level 2 consist of 10 security control components
(SCCs). Level 3 consist of 36 security control subcomponents (SCSs). Next, the framework
uses the proposed security criteria as a measure to comprehensively evaluate and rank the
security criteria using a multicriteria decision-making algorithm. Finally, the framework pro-
poses to compare the evaluated criteria to an ideal level and report (visualize) the evaluation
results in order to update the security by design.
Deploying a secure industrial IoT solution has only been recently proposed to provide
security analysis and mitigate vulnerabilities at the design/modeling phase [84]. However,
this proposal did not offer a practical solution for optimizing the design phase by evaluating
the system security features as this study does. Additionally, this study copes with the previous
limitation and aids in better security updates and patches at the runtime/simulation phase. The
proposed methodological approach combines the use of criteria importance and performance
rates for determining trust service attributes that a designer or policy maker should devote
more attention to. It also labels which feature should be lower priority to keep the focus on
the high-priority ones. Trustworthiness evaluation of vehicular cloud (TrustE-VC) [8] offers a
useful and practice-ready tool for designers and industrial CV practices to better evaluate and
select industrial CV trust requirements.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the background
of this study along with the underlying motivation. Section 4.3 presents the building blocks
of the vehicular cloud security stack, the evaluation criteria extraction method, and the related
work. A discussion of the proposed framework (TrustE-VC) and its main components is
presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 highlights the TrustE-VC framework outputs and results
that need to be addressed within the next-generation industrial CV and IoV-cloud platforms.
A comprehensive discussion and the future direction are discussed in 4.6, and finally, we
conclude this chapter with Section 4.7.
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4.2 Background
The focus on significant requests for sensitive data allocated from various sources drives us
to pay more attention to data security [5]. These confidential data can reside near the device
(on the edge/fog side) or in the cloud. This implies that the data can be attacked during
transmission or at their site. Data security and privacy are considered to be main barriers
for full acceptance of the IoT paradigm [107]. Most security threats and extensive privacy
issues stem from the lack of well-investigated security and privacy guidelines. However, these
guidelines and security requirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, audibility,
accountability, and trustworthiness) will give the IoT stakeholders the vision to build secure
IoT systems during the design phase, which aims to enhance IoT data security and privacy
and prevent data scams [64].
4.2.1 Vehicle-to-Cloud Connection
VC technology relies on vehicles’ onboard computing capabilities, storage, and sensing power
and leverages cloud computing services. Cloud computing represents a practical model that
supports the scalable deployment of management of large-scale collected data on the edge of
the network with a cost-effective and sophisticated approach of storing and processing big
datasets. In this context, the security of vehicle-to-cloud data exchange and communication
is a first-class concern among industrial CV practitioners. Overall, Figure 3.1 illustrates the
major layers associated with the industrial CV ecosystem, such as the connected vehicle layer,
edge/fog support service layer, and cloud service delivery layer [9]. In such an architecture,
the data life cycle is composed of several stages, with the data flowing from sensors and smart
objects to the cloud. It begins with data generation (e.g., collected from vehicles and IoV
infrastructure) by different objects, where connection security is required. The allocated data
are then assembled (using compression and aggregation) and transferred to edge IT and the
cloud. Following this, metadata are reserved, and the data are kept in the cloud storage within
a data lake, which can be multitenant storage serving several applications.
In the same context, the data life cycle flows among different VC service layers [101].
First, at the data generation point (very bottom) is the sensor mesh network, named object
and communication abstraction, which comprises physical smart devices such as sensors [93].
This layer includes hardware and firmware that provide car–to–car and car–to–infrastructure
(defined earlier as V2V and V2I) connectivity using different communication technologies
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such as Bluetooth and WiFi. Subsequently, with the vast number of IoV devices spawning
data, the storage and computation of these data will take place on the cloud. Hence, different
applications can harness it to make valuable decisions. It is worth mentioning that some
applications utilize stream data processing on the edge nodes (also including fog deployments)
such as traffic ahead or parking nearby. Finally, VC systems assist with the client applications
in the SaaS model. Both clients and administrators can remotely send commands to smart
devices at the bottom layer. It is vital to grant and sustain the architecture security in different
layers, including physical and network security, to edge and cloud platform security. This also
includes the framework and application security, security analytics (e.g., Trojan detection),
besides identification and access management control like authentication and authorization
with continuous security testing.
4.2.2 The necessity of VC security evaluation
The Internet of Vehicles in the cloud paradigm represents a responsibility transfer of data host-
ing, software control, and infrastructure management [43, 124]. IoV implementers are always
seeking to secure their operational environments, as security is always a first concern. On the
other hand, cloud providers improve their competitiveness in the cloud market by ensuring
that appropriate security expectations for their services are met. Security engineering (plan-
ning, designing, and assessment) that minimizes the vulnerability surface and meets clients’
security satisfaction is expected. However, it is challenging to meet these expectations unless
they are based on the results of systematic gap analysis and assessment. This analysis could
aid in evaluating the security level of every component individually as well as their integra-
tion. Evaluating the security level of a VC system enables the suggestion of an efficient and
effective plan that maximizes the security and minimizes the level of risk to an acceptable
level. Consequently, VC practitioners identify the unimproved gaps and have a clear sense of
the system security level and how to address the challenges.
IoV-to-cloud security evaluation aids in shaping the security policy of the service provider
as follows:
Achieve client satisfaction: Based on the security evaluation, the VC provider will pro-
vide adequate information regarding service enhancements to achieve the client’s highest level
of satisfaction. A security evaluation report will reduce the vulnerabilities among the system
components by allowing the security designers to control undesirable behavior. Additionally,
it will improve the security level and reduce the risk to the clients’ satisfaction.
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Improve VC services: A security evaluation can lead to a significant enhancement in the
system security that sustains its adoption by the clients. It can also guide service providers to
improve their service, in addition to determining and meeting the client’s requirements. This
information will assist VC providers in establishing a new service level that can meet IoV
needs.
Gain competitive advantages: The intelligent industrial CV business is rapidly growing.
A competitive and growing market share is vital for the industry. By providing a detailed
report on the service security status by conducting a security evaluation, customers can be
reassured regarding the security measures that maintain their data privacy and confidentiality.
This report, in return, leads to competitive advantages. High rates on a security evaluation
after classifying the standard security criteria improve the system reliability in the market.
Therefore, industrial CV providers could use this information to convince potential customers.
4.3 Material and Methods
This research contributes to the deployment of the VC security body of knowledge by first
examining in detail the building blocks of the vehicular cloud security stack architecture. Sec-
ond, it analyzes and classifies state-of-the-art security frameworks, which are mainly available
today as open-source platforms for sophisticated criteria selection. Third, a rigorous and ro-
bust evaluation framework based on evaluation theory, which guides VC service providers to
identify security gaps, is proposed. Finally, we highlight some open challenges and recom-
mendations for both service providers and customers for a comprehensive discussion toward
achieving the vision of providing IoV-cloud secure services.
4.3.1 Security Criteria Extraction
In this study, we conducted a systematic literature review of more than 500 papers, focusing
on the security, confidentiality, and privacy of IoT-based and cloud deployments during the
last ten years. The collection of articles was deployed in two different stages; initially, the
needed scientific papers were retrieved according to a scholar query executed in Publish or
Perish software1. These search queries analyzed academic citations using a variety of sources
of academically impactful conferences and journals (from Google Scholar and Microsoft Aca-




various metrics (number of citations, venue impact factor, etc.) to determine their impact and
perform simple statistical analysis. Afterward, Python code was developed to read the papers’
URLs from the previous record and download them in local files. Finally, we classified those
papers manually based on their main research idea.
This intensive review led to the exploration, identification, and understanding of six com-
mon security criteria (CSCs) that generally influence IoT security. Next, the interview study
successfully extended these CSCs (level one) from different research contexts into the VC
context by identifying ten security control components (SCCs) (level two) and 36 security
control subcomponents (SCSs) (level three), aiming to develop an effective IoV-secure solu-
tion in the cloud environment. The main evaluation criteria in our VC security framework are
presented in Table 4.1. These CSCs are further defined and described in the next section.
4.3.2 Evaluation target and criteria
A deductive content analysis method has been utilized to explore the qualitative data to avoid
random security criteria, which manipulates the evaluation process. The deductive content
examination ensures that researchers are unlikely to be working from naive perspectives and
concepts, which are inspected as the hallmark of interviews. This phase led to the following
conclusions:
Physical and Environmental Protection: This describes technologies used to safeguard
infrastructure assets against physical attack, i.e., sensors, actuators, network cables, etc., to
deter unauthorized physical access to provide security during data movement.
Logical Access Control: This is a subcategory of security that refers to a set of rules and
procedures that control access to infrastructure content or data. Authentication mechanisms
may be applied to increase the level of access security. In general, it is composed of two
main entities: First, authentication ensures that data are from legitimate sources by affording
perimeter security capabilities. It also checks that data are not from malicious sources or
nodes. Second, authorization ensures that only authorized objects are employed in collecting,
streaming, analyzing, and modifying the data of an IoV system. Additionally, it ensures
that access to the VC is controlled with only the commands necessary to perform authorized
functions to increase the level of access security. Furthermore, managing the IoV roles and
privileges and preventing any unauthorized functions are considerations. A supplementary
stage that improves the access control auditing includes nonrepudiation techniques. These
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Network Security Design (C11)
Smart Object, Sensor, and
Actuator Security (C12)
-Physical access control rights and roles (C131) -Multiple barri-
ers to physical access (C132) -Monitoring physical access (C133)
-Lockable physical casings (C134) -Disaster and incident manage-
ment (C135) -Mirroring and redundancy of the infrastructure (C136)
-Communication channels security (C111) -Network security design
(C112) (segmentation and isolation).





-LDAP-based and Kerberos protocol (C221) -Third party approach
(C222) -Dual-stage authentication (C223) (mesh network and edge)
-Smart object access control rights and roles (C224)




Wire Encryption (C31) -Multiple-level encryption (C311) -Blockchain encryption (C312)
-Transparent data encryption (C313) -End-to-end wire encryp-
tion(C314) -Identity-based encryption and attribute-based encryp-




(objects and edge/cloud computa-
tion)
-Data transmission protection (C411), e.g., SSL/TLS protocol -
System vulnerabilities/exploitable bugs (C412) -Data and wire en-
cryption (C413) -Hardware compatibility (C414) -Monitoring pro-





-Data replication (C521) -Failure history and recovery (C511) -
Redundancy of disasters and incidents (C512)
Data Privacy and
Governance (C6)
Data Privacy and Governance (C61) -Behavioral analytics and monitoring (C611) -Managing ser-
vice/operation log information and file (C612) -Tagging (data la-
beling for governance) and filtering (C613) -Automation of service
(C614) -Compliance with legalization (C615) (data and software) -
Compliance with SLA (C616).
approaches denote that the source cannot deny transferring the packages (i.e., data) it sent
earlier.
Communication Confidentiality: This is an associated process that guarantees that a
given data stream, i.e., from edge to cloud or V2V communications, can be recognized only
by the desired recipients. Encryption is a security tool for fortifying data confidentiality by
ensuring that an authorized entity can only access a piece of the given information (data flow).
Establishing confidentiality in the VC is required by service providers to ensure some specific
encryption control criteria. Several encryption methods can be applied to maintain confi-
dentiality and ensure that data are encrypted during the whole life cycle. Key management,
key distribution, and the encryption engine are associated concerns when implementing VC
confidentiality.
Communication Integrity: This is the status of ensuring that a malicious intermediate
does not modify data migration between its source and the data center (cloud). Regarding
data transmission, there is integrity confidence that data can only be obtained and edited by
entities that have access to a key (authorized client). The data integrity can be indicated by
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any malicious action while data are transmitted (e.g., a man-in-the-middle attack) between
smart objects to the cloud or between IoV components. Actions are taken to ensure integrity,
including managing the physical infrastructure, i.e., network and servers, restricting access to
data blocks and sustaining rigorous authentication processes. Service providers may enforce
encrypted end-to-end protocols to link connected vehicles and cloud service. Protecting edge
IT by developing a method for granting its resource privileges to enforce information flow be-
tween industrial CVs requires secure computing techniques such as a virtual trusted platform
module as a supplementary security measurement. This link guarantees that the transmit-
ted data between the edge node side and cloud service side through public networks remain
private and integral.
Data and Service Availability: This may also be referred to as resilience and fault toler-
ance, which aims to guarantee that data remain available at a required level of performance
in the event of the failure of system components. IoT-based paradigms mainly depend on the
availability of massive datasets when and where the data are needed by the client or an appli-
cation, which could be a workload on a private cloud or a service running on a public cloud.
Availability is commonly realized by providing data replication at the back-end of the service.
However, a more recent trend is to utilize edge/fog backups instead, seeking a performance
and time beneficial approach.
Data Privacy and Governance: This is an enabling technology that authorizes enter-
prises to effectively and efficiently meet the compliance requirements within the IoT envi-
ronment. It also allows integration with the whole enterprise data ecosystem (cloud or data
center) and exchanges metadata with other tools and processes within and outside of the VC
paradigm.
4.3.3 Related Work
The security of IoV deployment architectures and VC service security have always been a
concern and, hence, are a research trend. A large body of research aims to address this concern
in the literature with various insights [44, 105, 86, 85, 42, 107]. Recently, Gupta et al. [51]
proposed an authorization framework relevant to IoV and vehicular clouds; they discussed the
need for access control within such a sensitive environment. They extended their work with
the CV-ABACG [50] model, a formalized dynamic group, and attribute-based access control
for a smart car ecosystem. In [43], the integration of cloud computing and fog computing
for securing the data storage in IIoT deployment architectures was proposed. Meanwhile,
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realization of service-oriented models to securely access the underlying resources of cloud
manufacturing based on IoT technologies was attempted in [108].
A recent study by Yang Lu and Li Da Xu indicated that the security quality of service-
based design has the potential, as a leading research trend, to protect the IoT network [75].
This vital aspect was further investigated to enable security analysis and mitigation of security
threats [84]. A risk assessment for wired networks using attack graphs was studied in [99].
Security analysis of IoT systems based on the generic behavior by formalizing the interactions
among various IoT things and capturing IoT-specific threat classifications was reported [83].
However, all previous studies did not aim to evaluate the industrial IoT framework trust or
provide a ranking and selection approach among the security features. For this, TrustE-VC
aims at addressing this research gap and copes with the modern evaluation and selection
methodology.
Kayes et al. proposed a context-sensitive access control that supports control decisions
when there are dynamic changes to the context [61] and context-aware access control using
fuzzy logic [63]. Meanwhile, in [62] the context-aware access control policies at the runtime
is specified, and a pluggable single-sign-on authentication module is suggested in [23]. While
addressing the trust challenges of the ITS using cutting edge, big data frameworks was dis-
cussed in [22] with a multi-tier VC architecture. The work in [4] proposed a machine learning
algorithm for relay attack detection in the VC.
On the other hand, securing a vehicular network using a fuzzy trust model based on expe-
rience and plausibility to ensure the reliability of vehicle communications was reported [105].
While many evaluation models of cloud computing have been proposed in the literature [45,
100, 7], they do not yet provide practical analysis for security designers of cloud-based IoT
and VC systems. Aiming at improving the intelligent transportation system, Bui and Jung [29]
used a dynamic decision-making approach for CVs. However, evaluating multiple conflicting
criteria in decision making has not been a subject of intensive studies in the literature. This
advanced analytic method aids in better decision making to choose prioritized security im-
provement actions and, hence, ensure the trustworthiness of the industrial CV environment.
In this chapter, we address this main open issue by proposing a novel evaluation approach.
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4.4 VC Security Evaluation Framework
Defining the evaluation criteria is crucial to evaluating the performance parameters of the
target system (i.e., VC). In this section, diagrammatic VC security levels are proposed in
Table 4.1. These levels are used to assess the VC and then identify the unimproved gaps for
further enhancements. In total, this study proposes 52 different evaluation metrics, six in level
1, ten in level 2, and thirty-six in level 3. Level 1, namely, common security criteria (CSCs),
are hierarchically divided into 10 security control components (SCCs) in level 2. Those SCCs
are broken down into 3 specific security control subcomponent (SCS) techniques in level 3.
The final aim of this table is to provide a unified benchmark (evaluation criteria) to evaluate
the security of VC services within any proposed solution.
The TrustE-VC methodology contains a sequence of structured processes, which are de-
scribed using well-defined activities (i.e., inputs and outputs). In Figure 4.1, we propose a
matching methodology for instantiating trust requirements in a context pattern (structural de-
scriptions) of the VCs. The main processes of this method include preparation, examination,
and decision. The preparation stage starts with identifying the evaluation target (with suitable
variables) and describing objects that are subject to evaluation. Evaluation criteria point out
the characteristics and constraint parameters of this target by weighting these criteria (optimal
weight vector of the criteria). These evaluation criteria are further aggregated and associated
with a group of decisions to obtain the collective trust weight and start the data gathering (of
the available solution domain), which evaluates the rates of each criterion. This aggregation
must be assigned a fuzzy rate of fuzzy best and worst values to be evaluated properly [110].
Based on the evaluation results, the correlation among the criteria weight and ideal point (the
security gap) is scored and rated. In other words, evaluate the normalized fuzzy difference
to evaluate the fuzzy index value. This score can be utilized to report particular pieces of
information and prepare a mitigation plan that, eventually, updates any security breach or
vulnerability by determining the rank of the trust criteria mode.
Our evaluation framework is composed of three main components to assist with the se-
curity gaps of a typical VC environment: (1) Aggregation of the evaluation values of the
security levels, i.e., SCCs and SCSs in the decision-making method (group decision makers
(GDMs)), is proposed. Evaluation of the security level of the industrial CV based on a sin-
gular perception framework (one DM) can return poor decisions [112]. Hence, to acquire a
reasonable resolution, the use of GDMs is a suitable and relevant approach to knowledge syn-
thesis and collection. In [112], the authors’ results obtained from GDMs are more objective,
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Figure 4.1: Context-based pattern matching for a trust by design of TrustE-VC framework
as they combine different experiences and views. (2) Fuzzy set theory and fuzzy aggrega-
tion techniques are used to evaluate the security level of industrial CV criteria according to
the GDMs as a fuzzy multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) approach. (3) Simple additive
VIKOR associated with the performance analysis and performance rate is used to visualize
the framework findings, as proposed in [7].
4.4.1 Multicriteria Group Decision Making
To evaluate security solutions in a VC system using several components, we have to assess all
of its criteria. Usually, any computing system cannot function well with all evaluation criteria,
and hence, the investigator or security analyst has to map the trade-off among them. This is
especially relevant within large-scale architectures as in a typical industrial CV. Evaluating
and selecting the best security criteria tuning is the primary goal of our framework. Herein,
we propose a multidecision algorithm that feeds the fuzzy ranking model of our proposed
evaluation framework.
Next, we review some concepts regarding realization of the preliminaries of the criterion
space, fuzzy set theory, and the decision making approach, which combined represent the
basic principle of our proposed framework.
1. Representing the criterion space:
max i; subject to i ∈ I (4.1)
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where i is the vector of Y criteria and I is the feasible set, I ⊆GY . If G is defined explicitly (a
set of choices), the result is called a multiple-criteria (MC) analysis. If I is defined implicitly
(by a set of constraints), the result is named an MC process.
2. Representing the fuzzy sets:
To present the main concepts of fuzzy sets that link elements to define their membership to
a function, which is usually [0,1], the membership degree is generally a figure (special fuzzy
set), where χ pick rate on the real line, and q̃((χ)) is a continuous mapping of U to the closed
rate in the interval [0,1] as follows:
q̃ = (χ, q̄(χ)),χ ∈U (4.2)
3. Representing the decision making:
The decision-making process matches criteria to a set of potential decisions accessible
to the security designers and analytics. The criteria weight are the values of the security
evaluation. Hence, investigators set identical security metrics in the decision model based on
the specified security criteria. For example, when designing and implementing a VC solution,
the implementer chooses the design parameters (security criteria). Each of these influences
the security measures that evaluate the system components. Mathematically, an evaluation
framework can be described as shown below:
max i = f (e) = f (e1, . . . ,en)
subject to,e→ E; as follows:
i ∈ I = f (e) : e ∈ E,E ⊆ In
(4.3)
where E is the feasible set, and e is the decision variable vector of size n. A well-developed
specific case is achieved when E is a polyhedron defined by linear inequalities and qualities.
Different definitions are fundamental in TrustE-VC; these are closely linked to the nondom-
inance and efficiency defined based on both space and variable representations.
Definition 1: if there exists e∗ ∈ E, then e∗ ∈ E is not dominated when e≥ e∗ and e 6= e∗.
Definition 2: e∗ ∈ E is efficient if there does not exist another e ∈ E such that f (e) ≥
f (e∗) and f (e) 6= f (e∗). A key factor for a successful evaluation framework is a good
representation of the decision situation by a problem domain.
Definition 3: if there does not exist another i ∈ I where i > I∗, then we can say that i∗→ I
is weakly nondominated.
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Definition 4: if there does not exist another e ∈ E such that f (e)> f (e∗), then e∗→ E is
weakly efficient as well, including all nondominated and some other particular points.
These unique points appear in practice, which makes them vital. Moreover, it is essen-
tial to distinguish them from nondominated points. To illustrate this case, consider that we
maximized a particular objective, i.e., security criteria. Doing so may return a weakly non-
dominated point that is dominated. The dominated points of the weakly nondominated set are
located either on vertical or horizontal planes (hyperplanes) in the criterion space.
Ideal point: shows the highest (the best for the maximization weight) of each criteria and
compares favorable to an unfeasible decision.
Nadir point: shows the lowest (the worst for the maximization weight) of each criteria
among the evaluation set. The ideal point and the nadir point are useful in the evaluation
process to obtain the “quality” of the range of solutions.
Algorithm 1 illustrates our evaluation framework approach. Furthermore, it can indeed
be realized by a GDM model that feeds the fuzzy ranking model of our proposed framework.
Mathematically, problems corresponding to the above arguments can be represented as the
following formal definitions:
By defining the most suitable φ ∗ and the worst φ̂ values of all values of all test criteria,
i = 1,2, . . . ,n, φ ∗ = max(φ j, j = 1, . . . ,J) and φ̂ = min(φ j, j = 1, . . . ,J) if the ith function is a
benefit, whereas φ ∗ = min(φ j, j = 1, . . . ,J) and φ̂ = max(φ j, j = 1, . . . ,J) if the ith function
is a cost.
Here, S∗ =min(S j), j = 1, . . . ,J, Ŝ =max(S j, j = 1, . . . ,J),R∗ =min(R j), j = 1, . . . ,J, and
R̂ = max(S j, j = 1, . . . ,J). Eq. 4.5 is used to compute the group utility S j, which is used to
normalize the distance, and Eq. 4.4 is used to calculate the individual regret R j in order to



















Then, the comprehensive sorting index I j is computed using the following equation:











where j = 1,2, . . .J , R∗ = min(R j), R̂ = max(R j), S∗ = min(S j) and Ŝ = max(S j).
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Algorithm 1: Multidecision approach for weighting security criteria in the VC
framework
1 Require: Criterion functions f (y)i
2 Determine best φ ∗i and worst φ̂i values ∀ f (y)i;
3 if ith function represents a benefit then
4 φ ∗ = max(φ j), φ̂ = min(φ j)
5 else
6 φ ∗ = min(φ j), φ̂ = max(φ j)
7 end
8 Compute both values S j and R j.
9 Calculate the comprehensive sorting index I j
10 Rank the fuzzy values R, S and I in ascending order.
11 Select the min(I j) that represent the best ranked; the alternative A(1) is proposed as a
compromise solution.
12 if C1 is Acceptable advantage then
13 I(A(2)− I(A(1))≥ 1m−1 , where A
(2) is the alternative with the second position in
the ranking list by I.
14 end
15 if C2 is Acceptable stability in decision making then
16 The alternative A(1) must also be the best ranked by T or/and S.
17 end
This approach is introduced as a weight for the strategy of maximum group utility, whereas
1− v is the weight of the individual regret. A compromise between these strategies could be
reached by setting v = 0.5, and here, v is modified as (n+1)2n (from v+0.5
(n−1)
n = 1) since the
criterion (1 of n) related to R is also included in S.
4.4.2 Fuzzy Set Theory Modeling
Due to the subjectivity of the anonymous values of the security criteria, the evaluation of
the security level of industrial CV is imprecise and arguably vague. This imprecision issue
requires novel decision-making approaches that address the subjective evaluations. Fuzzy set
theory has been proposed as a pioneering solution, which aids in different areas [121]. In this
study, we employed this theory to express and manage ambiguity in decision making. The
linguistic variables in the fuzzy theory (e.g., very high, very low, low, and high) can afford a
powerful connection tool—by assigning a numerical variable within a binary set (0,1). These
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linguistic variables effectively model the vagueness or fuzziness inherent in decision-making
problems [112].
In this research, we utilized the fuzzy triangular numbers [65] that describe linguistic
variables connected with a membership degree of 0 or 1. This criteria enables modeling of
fuzzy operations with both convenience and simplicity. A triangular fuzzy number is a fuzzy




3 ), where (k1 < k2 < k3).
According to [65], in fuzzy triangular numbers, any membership functions of fuzzy num-
ber A can be defined as follows:













A fuzzy multicriteria selection approach for analyzing the performance of industrial CV
communications to the cloud was implemented by employing intuitionistic fuzzy numbers.
In the proposed model, linguistic terms are used to rate the alternatives via criteria weighting
and their corresponding fuzzy numbers.
4.4.3 Adaptive evaluation approach
To handle the problem of portfolio selection and aggregation of decisions, the SAW approach
is proposed and the method in [33, 76] is used. Due to its simplicity and ability to identify
unimproved gaps of alternatives, SAW has become the most popular decision-making (DM)
approach. According to [112, 33] SAW is considered to be straightforward and can easily
handle DM queries, motivated by its linear additive function, which can individually repre-
sent DM decisions. An empirical study [123] applied SAW and found superiority in both
performance and simplicity. The essential principle of SAW is to calculate and categorize the
weighted sum of the performance degrees for every criterion group.





xyxi j, j = 1,2, . . . ,u−1,q = 1,2, . . . ,v−1 (4.8)
For identifying evaluation criteria to achieve the ideal level of any tested standard, a mul-
tiattribute model called importance-performance analysis (IPA) was reported [81]. It is com-
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posed of a dimension matrix, namely, “Importance” and “Performance”, to explain evaluation
criteria graphically. IPA has been utilized for analysis in different studies to allocate unim-
proved gaps between various services. The use of IPA aims to describe the security criteria
associated with each industrial CV component. The IPA map is beneficial for deciding how
best to allocate unimproved gaps between an actual industrial CV system and an ideal point
depending on the evaluation criteria. In this study, we use the “performance rate” (PR) rep-
resented by the x-axis instead of “performance”, while “global weight” (GW) constitutes the
y-axis instead of “importance.”
The GW is used to demonstrate the importance of the criteria sample and examine the
reliability. Hence, the GW represents the importance and performance realization to improve
the system reliability. The weights range from 0 to 1 according to the following equation:
W =Wx ∈ (W1,W2, . . . ,Wn) (4.9)






,n = 1,2, . . . ,ni (4.11)
4.5 Analysis and Results
The proliferation of IoT devices had led to the generation of a considerable amount of het-
erogeneous data. The allocated data have to be kept in appropriate storage (e.g., the cloud),
which is remotely accessible for processing. Consequently, these data can be used to learn a
new pattern of behavior using a machine learning algorithm that embeds the intelligence into
any system. With this growing trend, new security issues have arisen. Tremendous security
criteria have been proposed to cope with these issues. However, our results demonstrate that
all security criteria are not equal, which means that such criteria should not be governed and
managed at the same level. Our novel framework TrustE-VC provides a trust measure of these
different security criteria. It may be utilized to classify the importance of each criterion based
on its distance from an ideal security point of the system.
Based on the results presented in Table 4.2, the average performance rate (APR) of TrustE-
VC and the ideal point for each SCC are converted to crisp values by applying Eqs. 4.9 and
4.10, respectively, which identify the best PR among the set. The GWs related to all of these
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Table 4.2: Highlighted TrustE-VC findings for the SCCs and SCSs.
SCC Criteria GW APR SCS Evaluation(CV ) Lowest PR Highest PR
Infrastructure Design C13 0.820 0.556 C111(0.580,0.886) C113(0.926,0.946)
Network Security C11 0.800 0.426 C121(0.506,0.820 C122(0.853,0.886
Object Security C12 0.840 0.648 C132(0.605,0.811 C131(0.820,0.926)
Authentication C22 0.875 0.485 C212(0.459,0.506) C213(0.800,0.886)
Authorization C21 0.600 0.416 C222(0.760,0.240) C221(0.926,0.946)
Wire Encryption C31 0.604 0.343 C316(0.126,0.300) C313(0.906,0926)
Integrity C41 0.820 0.420 C414(0.420,0.686) C415(0.820,0.906)
Data Availability C52 0.784 0.560 C521(0.766,0.806) —
Service Availability C51 0.755 0.546 C511(0.820,0.840) C512(0.866,0.886)
Privacy & Governance C61 0.738 0.369 C614(0.346,0.646) C613(0.811,0.926)
Overall Average 0.799 0.478 — —
values are converted to fuzzy numbers using Eq. 4.11. Next, the main APRs are mapped
against their GWs to graphically present a map depicting the SCC that is most in need of
improvement (see Table 4.2). It can be observed that TrustE-VC achieved poor results in terms
of authorization (C22) and encryption (C31). Thus, TrustE-VC should pay more attention to
and find the best strategy to improve these criteria. Moreover, the GW and APR datasets in
Table 4.2, with overall averages of 0.799 and 0.478, respectfully, were assigned to form an
IPA analysis for the VC. This aims at defining the linkage of both the x- and y-axes for each
IPA map.
Sensitive data should be located and transmitted securely throughout the whole life cycle
to guarantee high data privacy of such a deployment architecture, for instance, integrating the
IoT paradigm with the cloud for storage, processing, and data security purposes [106]. For
example, encryption researchers have traditionally responded by focusing on multiple CSCs,
such as transparent data encryption, end-to-end wire encryption, and data masking and tok-
enization. TrustE-VC can provide a blockchain of thing encryption services as a supplemen-
tary service to clients. Such an approach could let the client choose from the recommended
encryption software and techniques within different layers. Moreover, TrustE-VC needs to
raise the encryption level to include most elements existing at the TrustE-VC cloud level.
Multiple level encryption, blockchain encryption, transparent data encryption, identity-based
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encryption, attribute-based encryption, and wire encryption migration are all encryption rou-
tines to improve this SCC.
In contrast, C11, C51, C13, and C52 were the SCCs that obtained the most significant atten-
tion from TrustE-VC. These four criteria were estimated as satisfactory in meeting customer
needs, as they had the most leading APR rates. This analysis leads TrustE-VC to a significant
realization that these criteria should be retained from the VC customer points of view. This
assessment should help in attracting new VC customers and increasing business shares.
Table 4.2 shows that TrustE-VC has high-performance rates in most SCCs except for C22
and C31, as they are far from the ideal point. Depending on these conclusions, recommen-
dations are expected to enhance the unimproved gaps of TrustE-VC for these lower SCCs
through various strategies. For instance, a strategy could be considered to improve the pri-
vacy with an appropriate access control level to include most components in the industrial
CV system. Fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms, to operate appropriately under an in-
cident or a failure, are other examples, to name a few. Only four out of six SCCs have a high
APR for TrustE-VC, namely, data (C11 and C13) and access control (C51 and C52), in that they
perform fairly against the ideal point. The remaining APRs of the SCCs are lower than the
target point (ideal), in which each SCA criteria performs poorly against the ideal point. A
primary assumption would be that these SCCs need an updated strategy (including installa-
tion of new hardware and tools) to be improved. Additionally, the table shows the highest and
lowest value of each SCS criteria, except for data availability C52 which contains one SCS:
replication C521. Different SCCs within TrustE-VC need additional refinement to achieve the
target level. These SCCs have a lower APR than the other SCCs, which does not imply that
all SCCs have to be urgently improved.
In other words, it is necessary to identify the SCCs that need improvement action and
those SCSs under each SCC that need further refinement. An IPA diagram for TrustE-VC is
illustrated in Figure 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 to achieve the above objectives. In this 3D plot of the
framework findings, each CSC represents the x-axis. Meanwhile, the PR and GW of each
SCS represent the y-axis and z-axis, respectively. To represent the fuzzy weight variance,
Cn = (CSC(Cn),PR(Cn),GW (Cn)), and the final IPA(Cn) = ∑CSC+PR(Cn)∗GW (Cn).
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Figure 4.2: A fuzzy weight-variance 3D plot diagram for Physical Protection and Logical
Access Control CSC and SCC in TrustE-VC.
4.6 Discussion
Standardizing the industrial IoT is an essential measure to widely accept and support its tech-
nology [104]. However, the standardization process of the trust methods faces several chal-
lenges, among which is the lack of an evaluation approach of these standards and solutions.
A study that aims at evaluating the trust of current industrial IoT solutions with a focus on the
security criteria selection is indispensable. Along this line, this study proposes a methodolog-
ical approach to comprehensively assess a leading application in this realm, i.e., industrial
CV.
This research contributes to the deployment of the industrial VC security body of knowl-
edge by first examining in detail the building blocks of the industrial VC trust architecture.
Second, a rigorous and robust evaluation framework based on evaluation theory is presented,
which guides VC service providers to identify security gaps. Finally, we highlight some
open challenges and recommendations for both service providers and customers for a com-
prehensive discussion toward achieving the vision of providing trustworthy IoV-cloud secure
services.
The proposed approach combines the use of criteria importance and performance rates for
determining those trust service attributes to which a designer or policy maker should devote
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Figure 4.3: A fuzzy weight-variance 3D plot diagram for Communication Confidentiality and
Communication Integrity CSC and SCC in TrustE-VC.
more attention. Also it labels which feature should be a lower priority to keep the focus on
the high-priority ones. First, the proposed approach uses the three-level security evaluation
elements as a classification tree to analyze all the security elements in an industrial CV en-
vironment. Next, a multicriteria decision-making algorithm is applied for comprehensively
weighing these criteria. Together, they offer a useful and practice-ready tool for designers and
industrial CV practitioners to better evaluate and select industrial CV trust requirements.
4.6.1 Security by Design
Security by design is a development approach that ensures that security is considered from
the start of system deployment, and not as an additional late phase, to operate and maintain
the trustworthiness of industry 4.0 technologies [84]. Due to its inherently remote operations,
resource co-tenancy, distributed management, and administrative control, ensuring the privacy
of IoT-based workloads while outsourcing computation is crucial. Industrial CV clients do not
have direct control over the systems that utilize their data because of the cloud’s black-box
nature. In this context, modeling and optimization of IoT feature selection is an emerging
trend [3].
To this end, our study addresses an emerging research gap of optimizing the security
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Figure 4.4: A fuzzy weight-variance 3D plot diagram for Data and Service Availability, as
well as Data Privacy and Governance CSC and SCC in TrustE-VC.
features of an implemented industrial VC solution by evaluating and ranking these features
for optimal selection in the design phase.
Based on our test observation, the most pressing challenges in assessing IoT data protec-
tion before a move to the cloud are as follows:
• Data residency: This refers to the physical geographic location where the data stored
in the cloud reside. When deploying a cloud-based IoV system, the physical location
of the data is no longer known or fully trusted. Data residency also includes data flow
channels, data stream processing, and edge data input/output.
• Data privacy: This describes the ability to limit data sharing in industrial CV systems,
including with third parties, through an organization or individuals. Maintaining an
appropriate data privacy level can be achieved by exploring various technologies and
tools, including encryption. Other solutions include modifying policies and legislation
to prevent unauthorized access or use of data. Defining the legal ownership, responsibil-




• Data ownership: Defining data ownership is a serious concern within IoV-to-cloud data
processing. When a client transfers his or her data to the cloud, the primary processor
of that data is then not the physical owner, but the provider. Consequently, a new threat
parameter is raised regarding trust for that provider. The client cannot be sure how the
cloud system manipulates his or her data or whether the processing complies with his
or her demands.
4.6.2 Future trends
In this chapter, we address one of the leading open issues regarding industrial CV adoption.
Namely, we evaluate the security criteria during the design phase of a cloud-based IoT appli-
cation. We present a rigorous and robust evaluation model called TrustE-VC. The proposed
framework formalizes and generalizes the main ideas proposed in the literature for empiri-
cal evaluation and selection of security criteria. TrustE-VC’s main contribution is to help VC
platforms identify the standard security criteria and provide security gap analysis according to
a novel multicriteria decision-making evaluation theory for supporting industrial CV systems
as a commodity service in the cloud. Diagrammatic security levels, a novel evaluation theory,
and a fuzzy ranking approach based on additive weight and CV security analysis comprise the
critical framework components.
Future studies can focus on the following aspects. First, it would be interesting to employ
TrustE-VC on other VC implementations (frameworks) to capture qualitative risk evaluation
information in a highly complex decision environment. In particular, the approach could
be implemented with industrial CV providers to compare and evaluate the results of those
providers to identify the most trustworthy providers in today’s market. Second, utilization of
new MCDM utility approaches, such as SWARA (step-wise weight assessment ratio analysis)
and WASPAS (weighted aggregated sum product assessment) [80], can be applied to extend
TrustE-VC to cope with other scenarios and trust analyses. Finally, the proposed TrustE-VC
can be readily applied to extend the 52 security and trust criteria this study investigates. In
fact, due to the wide trust area to evaluate, this study focused on the threats associated with in-
dustrial IoV-to-cloud security threats. Hence, it is worthwhile to conduct broader research that
focuses on other trust criteria, such as privacy, governance, auditability, compliance, availabil-
ity, and competence. The extension of these trust evaluation criteria should involve as much
as possible the criteria that influence the trust of a suitable industrial CV solution. Finally,
integration of this evaluation framework with the edges of the vehicular network modes [41],
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e.g., V2V and V2I communication, is also considered a possible research trend.
4.7 Summary
A large body of research aims to address the security concern posed by the data transmis-
sion of connected vehicles with various insights. They do not yet provide practical analysis
for security by design of cloud-based IoT and VC systems. Ensuring sustainable security
integration of industrial CVs in the cloud environment with systematical security evaluation
and selection has been limited in this context. This study intends to investigate a VC evalua-
tion to offer assurances of the functional security properties of VC deployment architectures.
The proposed TrustE-VC framework aims to express imprecise trust evaluation information
to facilitate multiple-criteria decision analysis within industrial CV environments.
This framework provides a theoretical contribution based on the evaluation theory out-
lined by (1) categorizing a diagrammatic security taxonomy for security evaluation criteria
in industrial CV clouds, (2) promoting a GDM ranking technique for better security crite-
ria selection, and (3) introducing a fuzzy evaluation and ranking technique to evaluate and
classify the unimproved security vulnerabilities in IoV-to-cloud deployment architectures. It
also contributes to leveraging fuzzy sets and fuzzy IPA to accurately use the DM responses to
prioritize the CSCs, SCCs, and SCS to achieve a better coverage for enhancing unimproved
security vulnerabilities in current and future industrial CV environments. TrustE-VC aids in
better decision making to choose prioritized security improvement actions and, hence, en-
sure the trustworthiness of the VC environment. Overall, the use of TrustE-VC as a basis to
develop VC applications has proven the robustness and reliability of such a framework. As
future work, the usage of the proposed methodology and framework will be considered to






This chapter provides an overview of the study, presents conclusions drawn from results, and
outlines the future research.
Cloud computing is being steadily adopted as one of the dominant paradigms of BD plat-
forms. The new concepts offered by the cloud—such as computation outsourcing, resource
sharing, and external data warehousing—increase privacy concerns and security threats. BD
frameworks, as an emerging technology domain, lack model-driven engineering to secure
IaaS clouds. The software development methodology offered in this work focuses on creating
conceptual models that abstract the security-solutions domain—delivering reference modules,
basic requirements, main characteristics, and best practices for securing BD-cloud operations.
These concerns and security threats have been addressed in this research by drafting security
models for BD cloud adoption. This study proposes a component model that manages to stan-
dardize terminology, define key components and their relationships, collect relevant solution
patterns, and categorize existing technologies. It also presents a reference architecture for
big data systems that is focused on addressing security concerns associated with IaaS cloud
deployment architectures. This research demonstrates how to use this model for the develop-
ment of practical security solutions.
5.1 Extensive Summary
This thesis has successfully achieved the targeted objectives listed in Section 1.5 and has
achieved the following contributions:
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In Chapter 2, we analyze the security services used in IaaS cloud environments and de-
scribe BD security items and relationships amongst them. We discuss security systems ori-
ented to BigCloud design in order to present their glossary and landscape techniques and to
define research gaps and best practices. At first, this chapter extensively examines the building
blocks of the cloud security stack for supporting BD science and classifies the different layers
of security based on their supported service models into a reference architecture. An addi-
tional contribution is to classify the related security management technologies and services,
which is based on the Hadoop stack, and to survey related work. Second, it examines the
vulnerabilities associated with the BigCloud adoption by providing the security components
of a secure design pattern and its attributes. Third, it provides many insights into BigCloud
security specifications by refining the cloud context-pattern into a novel security analysis pat-
tern. This pattern maps the current technologies to the solution domain by extending the
CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) triad. Next, the study analyzes and classifies
the state-of-the-art security frameworks available today, mostly as open source, for a detailed
criteria election. Finally, it highlights some open challenges and recommendations for both
service providers and customers, for a comprehensive discussion towards achieving the vision
of providing a secure BigCloud service.
In Chapter 3, we identify the common security criteria (CSC) from a context-based analy-
sis pattern and discuss, compare, and aggregate a conceptual model of these CSC impartially.
A privacy granularity classification that maintains data confidentiality alongside the security
selection criteria is proposed. This work contributes to the VC security deployment body of
knowledge by facilitating the realization of secure internet of vehicles (IoV) systems in the
VC model by identifying the CSC. The chapter starts by examining in detail the building
blocks of the VC security stack for supporting IoV science. Then, it classifies the different
layers of security based on their supported service models into a conceptual model. Next,
it provides various insights into VC privacy by introducing a new security analysis pattern,
which maps the current VC architecture layers into the privacy granularity specifications of
the solution domain. Finally, we propose a security evaluation conceptual model that consists
of 6 criteria that influences VC security formation. The model methodology consists of se-
curity control elements (SCEs) that generally influence both the client and provider security
formation within the VC environment.
In Chapter 4, we address one of the leading open issues regarding VC adoption: evaluating
the security criteria during the design phase. We present a rigorous and robust evaluation
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model called TrustE-VC. The proposed framework formalizes and generalizes the main ideas
proposed in the literature for empirical evaluation and selection of security criteria. The main
contribution of TrustE-VC is to help VC platforms to identify the standard security criteria,
providing security gap analysis according to multicriteria decision-making evaluation theory
for supporting industrial CV applications as a commodity service in big data as a service
cloud. Critical framework components entail diagrammatic security levels, a novel evaluation
theory, and a fuzzy ranking approach based on an additive weight and VC security analysis.
Before we conclude this chapter, we extend these SCEs through identifying 39 security control
components (SCCs) and security control subcomponents (SCSs) that aimed to develop an
effective VC trust solution.
5.2 Future Work
This research opens different directions and works in the field of BigCloud security manage-
ment. The thesis and the proposed security by design provide new insights and benefits to
the security implementation in BigCloud. Also, it contributes to the security development of
BigCloud and to improve the understanding of security concepts in its associated frameworks.
The underlying goal is to help make sure that BigCloud security is developed systematically
with scientific validation principles. The result of this plan will be a set of tools to improve
approaches to securing the system features in such an environment. Continuing research is
aimed at developing an enhanced BigCloud implementation.
Future work for this study would also involve studying the evaluation framework over
different use-cases and scenarios. It includes refining the syntax and defining the semantics of
the proposed reference model as well as mapping the reference architecture to different cloud
security architectures and big data frameworks. In the future, more security evaluation criteria
are needed to be carried out on different BigCloud delivery models such as IaaS, PaaS, and
SaaS, based on specific customer requirement scenarios. This goal will ensure the robustness
of the framework, which can be adapted to suit the need of other BigCloud as for IoT-to-Cloud
practices and data channels. Further adaptation of the framework is also being considered to
ensure that the classification of security requirements and provisions can be automated into
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